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A. Introduction
The space program has generated many "fall out" benefits,
which were not an integral part of the initial plans, but
which often turned out to be just as important as the scienti-
fic results obtained from the research ob3ectives.
One such area is the know-how in the field of management
science which was acquired from the Nation's space involvement.
"The Unexpected Payoff of Project Apollo" by Tom Alexander
gives a superb summarization:
"The really significant fallout from the strains,
traumas, and endless experimentation of Project Apollo
has been of a sociological rather than a technological
nature: techniques for directing the massed endeavors
of scores of thousands of minds in a close-knit, mutually
enhanclve combination of government, university, and
private industry.
"This is potentially the most powerful tool in _an's
history. Until now, the only obvious applications
for a tool of this sort have seemed limited to something
about as massive, imperious, and glamorous as spzce
exploration or war. The question now is whether such
techniques can be refashioned and turned to other
tasks as well, to tasks as overriding in importance
and difficulty as, for example, the management of the
: earth's complex ecological system, of which man is but
: one segment. ,,1
t
t The reader should remember that these lines were written before
the first lunar landing had taken place. The author also
credited the space program at that time with the trY.buts
that President Kennedy's particular objective had not only
been obtained, but waa, meanwhile being taken for granted.
• l) Tom Alexander, "The Unexpected Payoff of Project Apollo"
Fortune Magazine, July 1969 issue, page 114.
, r |
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This brought about questions like:
! "If we "can land man on the moon, why can't we eradicate
pollution (or cure poverty or rebuild cities)?.2
To this date- five years after the lunar landing-no
clear-cut answer to this question has been given. The
application of acquired managemel, t know-how has been quite
3,4,5,6,7
successful in some areas, while it has failed in others.
It appears that an examination of underlying management
philosophies will be in order, and may shed some light on the
applicability of space program management to other projects.
Different demands on management may call for entirely different
approaches, just like production or sales management
require methods and procedures different from those for
research and development programs.
The importance of enlightened leadership for future
programs cannot be underestimated considering the many
problem areas that need to be improved: We need programs
to control world population, to feed the millions of hungry,
to prevent pollution and the depletion of resources, and
many others. It becomes apparent that any improvements
In the management for these complicated and difficult programs
of international scope will contribute to successful
program conduct.
J
2) Tom Alexander, "The Unexpected Payoff of Project Apollo"
Fortune Magazine, July 1969 issue, page 114.
3) J. Gordon Millikan, "Aerospace Management Techniques:
Commercial and Governmental Applications," University of
Denver, Colo., Nov. 1971-(NTIS-N72-14971)
4) Aerospace Management (A General Electric Publication)
Volume 5, number 1, 1970, pages 101, 111, 119.
5) W.W. Hagerty, et.al. "Research and Education in Management
of Large-Scale Technical Programs", Drexel University,
Philadelphla, Pc. June 1973.
6) J. Von Puttkame_ , "Apollo Management," VDI-Zeitschrift
Feb. 1973, Volume 115, Number 2, pages 89-99.
7) Thomas O. Paine, "The Relevance to r _4es cf Space Age
Management" Address to the Nationa. jonference on
Public Administration, Miami Beach, Florida, May 20, 1969.
3
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• As a first step towards such improvements, this research
study will define management philosophies as they applied
to mankind's greatest peacetime venture, the exploration
and utilization of space. These management philosophies
can then be appraised as to their applicability to other
major programmatic endeavours, like tho3e listed above.
Accordingly, this study will analyze management
approaches and philosophies as they have been appliea
during the Apollo Prcgram. The study will also determine
if these management philosophies apply across the board
withSn NASA, or if there exist already major differences
within the Space Agency• A few selected unmanned NASA
projects of significance have been studied for this purpose.
Similarities in management philosophies of these greatly
diverse programs will let it appear likely that they can
also be applied to other large undertakings of a research
or development nature.
From Similarities in management philosophies can be
concluded that the subsequently developed policies, methods
and procedures will also be useful in the management of
these other endeavours. It can also be expected that thelr
intelligent application can assure success of these future
programs.
This research study will limit itself strictly to programs
which have been completed. The ever-changlng methods and
procedures of active and "living" programs will not permit
the kind of analysis that has to be conducted. Also the
Judgement on their success will be very difficult to make
prior to actual completion of the project. This thinking
determined the selection of all case studies used in this
i
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B. Background
8
"Management of NASA's Major Projects" by Lee B. James,
summarizes research that had investigated methods and
procedures that managers had applied to the conduct of
their projects. The approaches used to manage these
projects were studied and existing NASA management documents
were reviewed.
The report was written from the point of view of a
project manager in NASA. Considerations in the ma_Ing of
management decisions were discussed. The author used his
personal experiences as a manager of one of NASA's major
projects to document-his observations and experiences in
project management. In addition, handbooks, policy guides,
4
instructions, and othor documents issued by the NASA Centers,
NASA Headquarters, the Air Force, and the Department of
Defense were reviewed for reference to pertinent project
management data.
In discussing overall management philosophy, it was
pointed out that a project manager cannot be passive. Rather,
he must be aggressive and on top of all facets of the project.
This is done by seizing the initiative at the beginning, with
' everyone connected with the project• Further, the project
v ,- i
8) Lee B• James, "Management of NASA_ Major Projects",1
i Report by the University of Tenn. Space Institute, '
i July 73. (NTIS-74N-10879)
• i
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manager is the expert on a given project and proven it by
i leading, _ot following.
_ Another way for a project manager's initiative to be
felt is in the development of his project plan as it is both
a requirements document and an imp]ementation plan. It is
not expected that the project manager write the project plan
himself. If he were to do this, other areas needing his atten-
tion may be slighted. However, he should decide what is in
the plan and review it systematically.
A management information system is considered essential
to track and measure progress. Such a system will not succeed
in a large project unless it is actively used and understood by
the managers.
The following items were discussed under "Management
Disciplines": Project Control, project planning, Manning,
Financial Accounting and Control, Project Scheduling, Con-
.. figuration Management, Change Control, Interface Control,
Systems Engineering, Software, Data Management, Reliability
and Quality Assurance, Testing and Test ManagementS, Safety, •
Logistics, Facilities, Maintainability and Producibility,
Specialists, Procurement, Project Records, and Experiments,
Each area is reviewed from the standpoint of what a project
I manager must consider to provide for these functions.
Under a chapter entitled, "Other Important Decisions",
are such items as: Human Relations, Project Contractor Re-
lations, Problem Resolution System, Control vs. Innovation,
I_-House Control, Subcontractor Control, Specifications,
J e I
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Make-or-Buy Criteria, Packaging and Transporting, What Level
to Track and Control, Weight, Performance and Schedule Control,
Computer Control, Communications Control, Failure Investiga-
tions, Amount of Flight Data, Tracking and Planning Acquisi-
tion, Planning for Flight Hardware, Launch Vehicle, Contractor
Organizational Phasing, Contractor Key Personnel, Committees,
Project Design Reviews, Visits to Contractors, Travel and
Overtime, Unsolicited Proposals and Ethics.
The last chapter of the report discusses the Low Cost
Approach to Project Management.
In summary, this initial report contains an overview of
practically all of the subjects with which a NASA project
manager will be confronted. It is primarily intended for use
by a newly-appointed manager and to serve as a'handbook
reference for his many, new, but vitally important functions
and decisions.
#
t
t
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C. Definition of "Management Philosophies"
Definition of "_anagement"
An excellent interpretation of the term "management"
as it is going to he used in the context of this study was
given by the Apollo Program Director 9 just prior to the
accomplishment of the first lunar landing:
"Management of a research and development program
is the integration of people into an organized
relationship with one another, and providin_ them
_', the environment, processes, means, and disciplines
required to attain a specific objective.
. "Size and complexity complicate the management task.
Apollo is the largest R & D program undertaken by
the United States Government to date. Thirty-five
major contractors, more than 4,000 lesser prime and
subcontractors, and a large number of Government and
Scientific organizations are involved.
"The management challenge has been to organize and
orient this complex structure to a singleness of
purpose or objective; that of producing the facilities,
e_uipment, procedures, and trained ground and flight
crews that are required to extend the boundaries of
this country's manned flight operations and to carry
out the operations on the surface of the moon for
whic_ the system is fundamentally intended."
9)' Sam C. Phillips, Lt. General, USAF, Apollo Program Director,
address to the National Conference on Public Administration,
at Miami Beach, Florida, May 20, 1969, "Management of Large
Research and Development Program_."
d
. $
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iAnother fitting interpretation of "management" is:
"The means by which you specify, gather, and
allocate resources to achieve specified objectives.
In this process the "manager" seeks and evaluates
information, makes decisions, and implements them,
usually through other people. ''10
It is the purpose of this research study to demonstrate
some of the typical pieces of information that the manager
has to seek as an input into his decision. These data are
not always easy to come by. They are often hidden, and not
apparent to the casual observer. It takes much searching and
prying to get to the root of the problem; but that is exactly
what is required for effective management. A good manager
has to know all the tools at his disposal. He has also to
be a master craftsman in their use. But, most of all, he has
to know the objectives of his project and he has to lead
the way towards an effective and prompt realization of the
established goals. To emphasize this point, let me also
II
pass on the following observation.
"There is a tendency to think entirely in terms of
• procedures, systems, milestone charts, PERT diagrams,
reliability systems, configuration management,
,
' maintainability groups and other minor paper tools of
I
the systems engineer and manager. We have forgotten that
someone must be in control and exercise his judgment,
his knowledge, and his understanding to create a system."
_0) Albert J. Kelley, Dean of The Scbeo! of Management at
Boston College, "Aerospace Management"- and
11) Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
R & D, quoted in the same article "Aerospace Management"
iD Astronautics and Aeronautics, August 1970, Volume 8,
Number 8, page 46. !
g i
!
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This interpretation of "management" reflects also the background
and intent of this study. A proficient manager has to display
leadership and. vitality to make his team meet the objectives of
the program plan in a timely and. effective ...._nner. Although it
is not intended, to dwell on the tools of the management trade,
it appears necessary at occasions to discuss methods and procedures
for a clear demonstration of implemented management philosophies
Gr their derivative policies. This is particularly true for the
case studies, which use these tools to arrive at conclusions
related to the philosophies behind the management approaches
which led to the decisions to take and implement the ind,¢ated
actions.
i
t
10
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Definition of Philoso hp_n_
Webster defines the term"philosophy" as follows:
"la: A love or pursuit of wisdom: a search for tile Underlying
causes and principles of reality: Investigation, Inquiry.
b: a quest for truth through logical reasoning rather than f_ctual
observation, c: a critical examination of the grounds for
fundamental beliefs and an analysis of the basic concepts
emp!oyea in the expression of such beliefs, d: a synthesis of
learning. ',12
This is one of several Webster definitions which appears
particularly suitable for applicatic'_ to our research: We want
to find underlying causes and principles which form the basis of
all actions taken by the manager; we want to understand the
logic and reasoning behifid decisions which have been made. 's
_pp]_ed to "management philosophies" we wan_ to define a set of
.
basic concepts and principles which will expla!l_ to future
Ranagers why, where, and how to apply these lessons. A set of
exm=ples will be used to conduct this study.
e
I
R
!
12) febster'_ Third NeT International Dictionary, (1965)
nPhilomophy"
t.
r-
11.
!,
I j
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Definition o£ "NASA _anagement Philosophies"
Top management of any organization must establish a
management philosophy to guide the efforts of their people.[
1 Such philosophy must be based on assigned roles and missions.
The Space Agency was created to recapture the technological
lea&ership from Russian space flight. This led eventually to
a presidential assignment to NASA to accomplish in the same
decade a manned lunar landing and safe return of the astronauts.
The many organizational and programmatic decisions to
fulfill this national desire are superbly summarized in "The
13
Natlonal Commitment to Apollo", which describes the establish-
ment of the Space Agency as well as the many ambitious programs
which were tackled immediately.
This background created a management philosophy which
permitted accomplishments that have not be_n equalled by other
peacetime ventures. Presidential and congressional support allowed
NASA Management to establish a philosophy which was to embrace
the intent to become leading in engineering, technology and
science. This required the hiring of the best available talent,
the mergi:ig of these people into dedicated teams performing their
difficult tasks with ambition and perseverance and the most
advanced equipment at their disposal. Outstanding leadershlp
and the best available management tools were required to perform
the Job successfully.
f
13) Robert C. Seamans, Jr., "The National Commitment to Apollo-
_t
i Action and Reaction --Astronautics & Aeronautics, August,
September, and October 1969, Volume 7, Numbers 8,9, & 10
(The Minta-Martin Lecture 1968-1969), pages 32 ff., 44 ff., _
L
1 !
1
t
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In a chapter on "Management.. Philosouh__y_v" by the Apollo14
Program Director the management task has been described
as a 3-dimensicnal matrix that illustrates the relations
between the management process, the functional areas in which
the process must be exercised and the variables to be
controlled.
The management process includes the management activities
of defining the requirements baseline, measuring the
performance, analyzing & assessing, control?ing & directing
of changes, and action & feedback. These are equivalent to
management interpretations in textbooks which normally
include planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and
directing15.- A detailed listing of management tools as
they _efe used in Apollo is shown in the enclosure.
The functional areas of management are listed as Program
Planning & Control, Systems Engineering, Reliability Quality
Assurance, Testing, and Flight Operations. The Apollo
Program Offices in NASA Headquarters and all Field Centers
were organized in accord with this breakdown, often referred
to as the 5 "Gem Boxes? 16
The three variables have been defined as Scheduling, Costing,
and Performance Appraisal (technical). The main task of the
, Apollo Program Director as well as of all Program Control
#
Offices was to monitor and control these measures of progress,
performance, and expenditure.
• , _ --_ z=
14) Samuel C. Phillips, Major General US&F, "Management
Scheme for Apollo" in Science and Technology Series,
Vol. 12, "The Management of Aerospace Programs"
(American Astronautical Society), page 193.
15) Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, "Principles of
Management," McGraw-Hill, 1972.
16) Roger E. Bilsteln, "The Saturn Management Concept",
JuDe I, 1974, MSFC Publication NASA CR-129029, page 15.
GEM stands for George E. Mueller, the Associate Administrator
for Manned Space flight at that time.
i
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Lee B. James expressed in "Management of NASA'S Major
Programs" on the third page of his introduction the following
thoughts :
"Let us discuss the overall philosophy first.
In a nutshell, it is that you cannot "passively"
be the manager of any major project. You must be
agressive; you must be on top of all facets of the
project. ,,8
The NASA Deputy Administrator expressed his thoughts in an
article which introduced nine other papers by NASA personnel on
the major facets of design, development, and operations in the Apollo
program as follows :
"I see one overriding consideration that stands out
above all others: Attention to Detail. ''17
A former Director of the G.C. Marshall Space Flight Center (_ISFC)
hac expressed in an interview this need by the words "one should
leave no stone unturned ''18 to look into all prcject details.
His successor stated:
"One of the key functions of management is to
ask searching questions--the probing questions
to locate the weakest links in organizational or
• _ procedural systems ''19 r--4
He also stressed the importance of communications inside of
an organization and also to the outside. °
The Apollo Program Director added a systems-oriented viewpoint
to these individual philosophies by the statement:
8) Lee B. James, "Management of NASA's Major Projects", Ref. 8,
Report by the University of Tennessee Space Institute, July
1973.
/7) George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, 'That Made Apollo A
Success?" Astronautics & Aeronautics, March 1970, page 45. i
18) Wernher yon Braun, Interview with this investigator in summer
1974.
19) Eberhard F.M. Rees, Aerospace Management, 1967, Vol. 2, Number
2. (A General Electric publication). _:
14
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"_nagement of a research and development program is the
tl, v, _gration of people into an organized relatiovship with
c,tJ", another, and providing them the environment, processes,
g9
_.ans, and ui_;ciplines required to attain a specific objective.
The experienced manager will want to apply proven techniques
_:o accomplish optimum integration of personnel and material.
Lb¢_. ;_chniques call initially for the definition of program
%'equ:i,;Dents, which should be built on inputs from the working level.
The ma _ager has to assure that no aspect of the project is overlooked.
Hv has to integrate the many individual pieces of data into a meaning-
fu] system which will accomplish the defined objectives. His exper-
ience and his background should uncover those areas where additional
analy_is is warl'ented. His management team and the established
mana"_'ement process (see enclosure) will be of tremendous help.
It is a manager's prime responsibility to assure that his
actions as well as those of his people will lead to success. A
prolerly implemented, success-oriented management philosophy will
_ertainly enhan- efforts towards this goal.
Tho nanager will have to make his m_nagement philosophy known
t_ those why must be guided by it. Since "philosophy" in itself is
too general a term for implementatxon, the manager will have to resort
to the issuance of "management policies." These in turn will have
to be translated in%n guidelines and instructions to the team.
They ca_ be ver_ _pecific and should clearly express the manager's
philosophies_ They should be distributed to the entire team for/
guidance and implementation, All subordinate managers will appraise
previ,ml ly valid policies and applicable procedures. The results
of such appraisals will determine if the former tools are still
Pc_eptable, and if they can be used "as is", or if they need changes
and 2mprovemeuts.
• T'-_am"_C. Phillips, Apollo Program Director, "Management of
Large R & D Programs."
, 25
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D. Impact of Management Philosophies on Major NASA Programs
In order to study the impact of management philosophies
on major NASA Programs it appears proper to select for the
initial research the largest and most complex program. This
is Without doubt the lu_lar landing which has become known the
world over under its program name "Apollo."
This study as well as other literature, sometimes refers
to it as the "Apollo/Saturn" or"Saturn/,%pollo" program. Such
nomenclature gives credit to the selection of the large
Saturn Booster, which had a major part in the accomplishment
of the lunar mission.
The Apollo/Saturn Program has not yet been surpassed in
size or in effort by any subsequent R & D effort, while many
of its lessons are being applied to such follow-ons as Skylab,
the Space Shuttle, the Space Lab, and even some non-aero_)ace
programs.
In order to test the management lessons from Apollo against
other experiences, the last few "case studies" will be taken
_l from selected unmanned NASA Programs. This step will test the
conclusions drawn from the Apollo experiences in regard to their
validi*.y for other major NASA endeavours. °
One of the most important steps in successful management
is comprehensive and realistic planning, to include "systems
engineering". The task is to identify the way in which the
hardware, the software, facilities, people, and procedures
will be put together into a complete "system" which must be
designed to meet the established objectives in a timely,
cost-efficient manner. The systems engineers are also
responsible to define all interfaces as well as the technical
requirements of the sub-elements that make up the to_al
operating system.
e.
16
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Early in the program--often even before its actual
beginning-the system engineers will study many different approaches
to accomplish the objectives; they will conduct trade-offs between
these alternate solutions based on cost, time, risk, and/or
other important criteria_ they will select the be_t method to
meet the objectives of the program. They will "leave no stone
unturned" to assure that all possible solutions have been
appraised in sufficient detail.
Because of the importance of this early phase, it was
considered desirable to touch briefly on the thought processes
that led to the chosen approaches of the lunar landing and to
specific design solutions. There appears to be no better way
to demonstrate the effect of management philosophies than to
use typical decisions made along the way. Enlightened program
management will consider also the history and back-ground of
the teams and their individual members. At least a cursory
look at the political circdmstances a,d associated sideline
facts and figures is needed to relay an actual and factual
picture. Only a review of the total situation will assure
satisfactory answers to the many questions concerning the
acceptance of certain approaches and the rejection of many
others.
Some of the used information is not publicly available,
,!
t since it has been taken from internal NASA files, from corres-
I
pondence, talks, presentations, and other internal events.
However, some of this material will eventually become publicly
available through the NASA Historian at NASA Headquarters. 16
A recent publication covers many aspects of Saturn Management.
An Updated and more detailed version elaborating especially
on historical events is in preparation by the same author
and should be available in due time.
jr ----
16) Roger E. Bilstein, "The Saturn Management Concept",
1 June 1974, MSFe-Saturn Publication NASA CR -129029
17
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Apollo Program Philosophy
When President John F. Kennedy announced on May 25, 1961
that a lunar landing would be the focal point of this Nation's
i space exploration efforts there was no rocket in existence or
on the drawing boards that approached the needed boost capability;
nor was there a spacecraft under development that could fulfill
i the requirements of flight to the moon, to land there, and
subsequently to return to earth. The only manned spacecraft had
just completed a suborbital flight putting the first Ameri,;an
In space for just a few minutes. This one-man spacecraft had
only very limited capabilities for attitude control and re-entry;
it was short in life support capabilities and could not change
orbits to any important amount. Tremendous strides had to be
made in rocket boost power as well as in spacecraft technology
J before a lunar landing could be performed.
! To accomplish these major feats took support from all
f management levels, up to and including the President of the U.S.i
i Without his wholehearted support, the landing could not have been
completed ill that decade. The decision to take such a majorstep was strongly supported by the political atmosphere at that
._ time, crea_ed in part by several recent Russian space accomplish-
ments. It also aemanded outstanding leadership within the ranks
of the newly organized Space Agency, since the support of just
one such major project, possibly to the detriment of others, would
certainly create dislocations and manpower problems. But,
fortunately, all requisites were there, and the program got
under Way.13,20
On January lO, I962, it was publicly announced that NASA
would develop a new, much more powerful rocket considerably
larger than the eight engine Saturn I, whic_ had been under
development by the U.S, Army.
13) _ Robert'C'. Seamans, Jr., "The National Commitment to Apollo",
pages 32 ff/
20) John P. Kushnerick, "The Fight For Spaceflight", Aerospace
Management, Sept. 1963.
/
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Saturn I Program Ph%losophy
I The advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) had
I begun on August 15, 1988 a research and development project
t which eventually evolved into the Saturn Program. 21 After
NASA had resumed program responsibility for Saturn in 1960
it was decided for performance reasons to use liquid
22
hydrogen and liquid oxygen for all upper stages. This
decision demanded the development of a new engine for this
propellant combination.
_The proposed launch vehicle program was based on the
"modular" or building block concept, which was supposed to
provide opportunities to "custom-make" launch vehicles
just by selecting the proper combination of stages. The C
(for "configuration") -I vehicle was the simplest. It
consisted of the first sta_e, and two upper stages. The
top stage was a modification of the Centaur which was under
development and would have been available whenever needed
by the Saturn Program. As it turned out, use of this stage
was never required, although many studies of this combination
were made.
The s_cond stage was designed for propulsion by 6
improved Centaur engines. It was grossly underpowered, and °
provided only very limited payload capability of the early
Saturn I vehicle, but management had decided to proceed
with the project to obtain flight experience with hardware
and launch crews. However, development o_ a more powerful
zi} WiXliam 1_. Lucas, "Political Bugs" Astronautics &
Aeronautics , October 1972, Volume 10, Number 10, page 44.
29) John L. Sloop, "Looking For the Sweet Combination",
Astronautics & Aeronautics, October 1972, Volume 10,
Number 10, page 52.
] 19
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1upper stage was undertaken as soon as a new high thrust
hydrogen engine became available. This improved stage
would also later serve as the 3rd stage of the lunar launch
vehicle.
But even this thrust increase did not result in a
highly efficient booster. The "modular concept" projected,
therefore, the use of a more powerful second stage.
However, as it turned out there was never a program require-
ment for such vehicle. The flexibility of the "Modular
concept" was never needed, and this apparently highly
desirable concept died by the wayside.
The lesson here is that even the most attractive
concept philosophies are meaningless unless they meet
specific requirements. A mere capability does not necessarily
lead to an actual program. Some staff planner had invented
• the "modular concepts" without down-to-earth requirements
from the working-level.
A number of Saturn I and Saturn 1B flights were
eventually conducted. Their use was planned in accordance
with the management philosophy to place unmanned and later
manned command and service modules into earth orbit as
quickly as possible. These launches permitted flight
testing more than a year ahead of the Saturn V availability.
: The results _rovided early flight test experience and
contributed greatly to the reliability and dependability of
the Saturn booster. The use of the less expensive Saturn I
vehicle saved money as an added benefit.
20
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The Need for the Saturn V
More than six months of intensive studies followed
President Kennedy's challenge of May 1961 before it was
decided on January 25, 1962 that the Saturn V would be
the launch vehicle for the lunar landing mission. The
needed thrust level would be obtained by clustering of
F-I engines. One of these engines provides the same
thrust level as the entire first stage of the S-I launch
vehicle. A new second stage would be powered by a cluster
of hydrogen engines, while one such engine would power the
third stage of the lunar launch vehicle.
The decision on this approach was made on the
basis of results from early studies of 3 proposed modes
for the lunar landing mission, namely the direct flight
to a landing on the moon's surface, the Earth orbital
13
assembly mode, or the Lunar Orbital Rendezvous mode.
In July 1962, it was decided on the basis of
cost, schedule, and especially astronaut safety that the
lunar orbital rendezvous mode would be used. This
_! decision finally permitted the designers and developers
i to accurately determine the requirements of the Satur_ V
launch vehicle.
t
The magnitude of the payload capability could now be
settled on the basis of this decision. Also the volume to
accomodate all spacecraft modules within the payload portion of
the carrier could now be established with sufficient accur_.cy
I to Proceed with the launch vehicle design.
13) Robert C. _eamans, Jr., "The National Commitment to
Apollo" pages 39 ff.
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The results were a three-stage launch vehicle capable of (:_
sending almost 50 tons of payload to the moon and/or
boosting 125 tons into a low earth orbit. Contracts had
been entered already with the Boeing Company for the
development of the first stage S-IC, and with North
American Aviation, Inc. (Now Rockwell International,
Space Division) for the second stage S-II; however, the
exact number of engines as well as the tank sizes had not
i
been settled. Such a launch vehicle and its spacecraft
would weigh over six million pounds when fuelled.
Therefore, at least 7.5 million pounds of take-off
thrust would have to be generated by 5 F-I engines. 23,24
NASA had assumed a certain de_ree of risk when
entering into stage contracts before the design had been
frozen. However, in the interest of collapsing lead times
for preparation of RFQ's, proposal evaluation, contract
negotiations, and other more administrative than
technical considerations, management decided that it would
be wel_ justified to proceed in spite of many uncertainties
as to technical details. It must also be said that the
contractor performance judged on the basis of the end
results, was superb, although during the course of the
development, many problems came up, a few of which will
_ be briefly discussed in the following pages.
This rather detailed account was provided to impress ,
on the reader the need for comprehensive planning, which is
_o important fox" the execution of successful programs.
Of course, a brief study like this one can only touch
on very few typical incidents of decision making.
_3) David S. Akens, "Saturn Illustrated Chronology", MSFC,
• MIIR-5, Janu_try 20, 1971. i
24) David S. Akens, "An Illustrated Chronology of MSFC," |
MSFCt_UlR-10 _ May 1974. !• 82
1
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Spacecraft and Launch Site Development
Detailed attention to planning is a result of established
management philosophies. Repeated anJ thorough reviews at all
!evels demonstrate the implementation of this philosophy, for
which schedules and procedures are well established. The lead
role os the manager is apparent.
The just described booster development was paralleled by
simultaneous activities related to spacecraft, the launch and
test sites, and others. All these program elements were just as
critical for the Apollo success as the booster development,
which'was selected for a more detailed disc_,_sien in this
study i
It is, however, not the purpose of this management study
to relate the entire history of the Apollo Program. Good
31
historical documents exist 25'26'27'28'and provide excellent
information. The management aspects of their development are
discussed in pxeviously quoted references 1,9,13,17 and others.
_5) Wernher yon Braun and Frederick I. Ord_ay III, "A History
of Rocketry and Space Travel (New York, 1969).
26) Wernher yon Braun and Fred Wipple "_oon, Man's Greatest
Adventure", Harry N. Abrams, Inc.
" 27) Robert L. Roshott, "An Administrative History of NASA,
1958-!_63", NASA 3P-4101 (1966).
28) Beirne Lay, Jr., "Earthbound Astronauts", 1971 Prentice
Hall, Inc.
31) "The Kennedy Space Center Story"--U.S. Government Printing
Office: 1974-740-742.
The MSFC references 23 and 24 present considerable detail on the
overall Apollo program. Several slmilar publicatlons by other
NASA Centers are available for additional detail.
!
I 23
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E. Case Studies For Aq_
Extensive planning had preceeded the beginning of the
Saturn/Apollo program 21. This fact permitted a rather realistic
initial cost estimate for the Apollo Program, as well as proper
selection and engagement of all resources. An outstanding team
of expc_ts could be secured. Replanning continued throughout
the duration of the program. These plans had built-in flexibility
for "unscheduled" events. A few of these "unscheduled" evevts
have been selected to demonstrate the effect of existing
management philosophies.
These "case studies" have been arranged in a more or l<.ss
historical sequence, although m_ny of these events took place
over.extended periods of time/ and overlapped w'th others.
Alternative9 planned into the systems, solved many problems by
straight-forward management decisions. Some of the more intricate
problems have been selected for our management analysis.
The two most outstanding "unscheduled events" were the Apollo
204 Fire and the Apollo 13 Mishap. Neither of these two
events will be discussed in this study, since congressional
participation may provide too much bias. These two subjects
29
have been extensively documented. Tne Apollo Fire caused
top management to re-assign some personnel within NASA and at
the contractor. A review of the existing literature has not
_: shown any _ross deviations in the handling of these 2 major
mishaps from management measures discussed below. ,:
21) William R, Lucas, "Political Bugs", see page 19.
29) George E. Mueller, "Apollo Actions in Preparation For
the Next Manned Flight;' Astronautics & Aeronautics,
August 1967, Volume 5, Number 8, pages 28 ff.
There exist also many congressional records on both events, i
24 •
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The follow2ng "Case Studies" will describe the handling
""_'""_"" _ " Earlyof _yplcal u., ........... events, events in the
program, such as the All-Systems-Vehicle Explosion, estab-
lished a pattern for trouble shooting methods and were
documented to guide in the solution of future "unscheduled"
events. Their managers could use t._e established policies
and proced_ es to best advantage• Decisive management
action always 9rovided effective remedies which kept the
program on track. Creation of temporary, trouble-shooting
"task teams': was one of the favored approaches.
"There is no substitute for leadership.
Effective organizations develop processes
and structures that help management identify
critical issues and problems as they evolve,
and provide flexible procedures for rapidly
zpplying reme. ies. ,,13
These "case studies" demonstrate the effectiveness of
the Apollo Program Management methods and procedures and
endorse thereby the established management philosophies
during the program control phase. They provide little
insight into the initial planning process, which therefore,
due to its importance, was described on the preceeding
pages.
l
13) Robert C. Seamans, Jr. , "The National Commitment
to Apollo --Lessons Learned" (Part II)
Astronautics & Aeronautics, September 1969, Volum,_ 7,
l_d_r 9, page 45.
2S
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Case Study #I: "All Systems Stage"Explosio_nn
a. BACKGROUND
The fledgeling Saturn/Apollo Program encountered its
first major mishap _n January 24, 1964, when an "All Systems
Stage" exploded during the final phases of a countdown in
preparation for a hot firing test. The "All Systems Stage"
had been prepared as a prototype of an actual flight stage.
As the name indicates, all electrical, electronic and
mechanical systems typical of a flight vehicle had been
assembled and a hot firing was to demonstrate thei! operability
and performance during engine operation.
The static firing of this stage had originally been
scheduled for January 1962; this would have been six months
prior to the static firing of first flight stage. However,
procurement problems and technical difficulties delayed these
initial plans, as well as the need to use this stage to
develop hydrogen loading procedures, and insulation and
bulkhead repair techniques.. Marshall Space Flight Center
and Douglas management had expressed a desire to fire
the "All-Systems Stage '_ prior to the forthcoming launch of the
first Saturn vehicle with a live second stage to increase
statistical confidence in the flight hardware.
, b. Description of Event
' The "All-Systems Stage" was mounted in a test stand at
Douglas Aircraft's Sacramento Test Station in California.
Attempts on the two previous days to perform a static firing
had been scrubbed due to leaks of a liquid oxygen line in the
umbilical disconnect assembly and a non-operating fuel fill and
drain valve. A number of other irregularities had also been
noticed during these two previous attempts, which led to several
corrections based on verbal agreements and engineering
judgements: The fuel fill and drain valve had been replaced because
30).K.H. Debus, "Final Report-S-IV All-Systems Stage, Incident
January 24, 1964", Internal NASA Report. i
I •
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of the malfunction on the previous day; a helium shut-off v_]ve
had been exchanged and retested. Automatic loaulng of propellants
began and was completed despite a number of technical problems.
A few deviations from established handbook procedures were agreed
upon, and the terminal portion of the countdown was finally
entered. The hot firing test also simulates the first stage burning
period during flight by a respective time delay. Several
abnormalities occurred during this time, but did not lead to a
cut-off signal. Only when the water supply for the flame
deflector as well as the steam supply for proper diffuser operations
malfunctioned, was automatic cutoff initiated, blmost a minute
(approx. 53 seconds) after cut off, the stage exploded with
three blasts, resulting in total destruction of the stage and
heavy damage to the test stand.
c. Management Actions
Immediately upon learning of the mishap by phone Dr.
yon Braun made the engineering talents of _larshall Space Flight
Center available to project management. Their task was to
assemble all the facts and .to analyze the causes of the explosion
as well as to prepare recommendations for remedial actions,
Since the next launch vehicle was poised at the Cape for an
early take-off and needed direly all information on this mishap
as input the Director of Kennedy Space Center was requested to
chair the investigation committee. A key MSFC engineer
thoroughly familiar with booster static firing procedures and
ground support systems was appointed deputy. Both were supported by
other experienced test and design personnel from MSFC. Represent--
atives from NASA Headquarters, other NASA centers, as well as
a key contractor spokesman were added to this NASA team.
The formal authority of the team was established in a
memo by Dr. yon Braun, dated January 29, 1964. This was
amplified on February 4, 1964 by additional instructions from NASA's
Dr. 6. Mueller. The initial contingent of team members an.ived
at Sacramento on January 26, 1964 at 5:00 a.m. and began
;
t
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immediately data collection. For this purpose the contractor
was requested to make all data, records, personal notes, etc.
! available for committee review.
The test stand area and all supporting facilities had
been impounded immediately upon the incident, as well as all
recorded evidence, such as "as-run" procedures, audio tapes,
recordings, oscillographs, etc. Instructions had been given
to the contractor right after the incident _s to the handling
of such materials, as well as the general control of the
situation.
The gathering and analysis of all available data and
other evidence continued until the Committee issued an
initial report on February 6, 1964. Fortunately, for a
conclusive analysis, much of the damaged hardware was in a
condition to allow an orderly process of configuration
verification and even functional testing of many components.
The technique used by the committee in pursuing this
investigation was to record known facts; formulate questions to be
answered by the appropriate contractor personnel and to assign
tasks to be performed by contractor test teams. By this method,
it was possible to narrow down the analysis of a series of
unusual events which had occurred and to identify the pertinent
facts. The final report contained all information of the initial
issue and in addition, supporting test and invest%gative data.
At the committee's request, the contractor submitted company 0
recommendations for corrective action. These recommendations were
reviewed by the committee and supplemented and/or modified based
on best judgment. They included improvement of operating ,
effectiveness of the Sacramento Test Center and implementation of
16
remedial actions at other NASA static firing sites.
_6 )" Roger E. Bi'iStein, "The Saturn Management Concept" Saturn
Report NASA CR-129029, June 1, 1974, page 32.
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d. Cause o2 Incident
The committee had at their disposal for the determination
of the cause of the incident complete data on the "All-Systems
Stage," as well as previous Battleship and Flight Stage test data.
In addition, essentially ail h%rdware of the stand systems and a
substantial portion of the stage controls were available for
inspection and testing, because of the short duration, o_" the
ensuing hydrogen fire. It was determined that the explosion
was caused by _he rupture of the stage oxyge,j tank, which was
caused by the failure of the two redundant oxygen vent valves
to relieve as intended. The principal cause of the relief valve
failure was the abnormal presence of solid oxygen formed because
of the abnormally cold temperature.
It should be noted that this incident might not have
been destructive if the sequence had not been interrupted by the
failure of the steam ejection system to supply the proper
vacuum to the engine diffuser, and if the cooling water system
had operated satisfactorily.
Twenty-five (25) major and minor abnormalities were noted
in addition to those discussed in the previous paragraphs.
e. Conclusion
This mishap was of considerable impact on the entire Saturn I
program. Drastic measures were taken to avoid repetition. ]_any
: important lessons were learned, which definitely enhanced the future
progress of the Saturn/Apollo program in a very positive way. #
Methods for trouble shooting which were applied to this event
established a pattern of investigation, team selection, and
remedial actions for all future " u_cheduled events."
This case study demonstrates the active management of
problem areas by the Program Manager as veil as specific actions by
2
his institutional supervisor, who called on his major manpower
_esources to provide quickly the moat effective specialist farces
i
: t
U
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Dwhich will be needed temporarily to clarify the situation.
The assignment of this investigation team is to "leave no stone"
unturned to uncover all the facts, _nd to recommend remedies to
prevent re-currence of similar mishaps,
This first case study also demonstrates the function of
the investigating committee _s a special "task team". This
operating method was many times successfully employed throughout
the program. Rapid establishment of such teams when needed,
clear assignment of specific and time-limited tasks and quick
implementation cf recommendations for remedial measureE are
typical management functions which will determine a manager's
)
effectiveness and control over his progr_o
Another interesting fact is provided by extensive
evaluation of this ac_Ident in regard to the effect of an
explosion of pre-mixed propellants. The results of this study
32
are documented in a special NASA report.
L
32) J.B. Oayle, NASA TN D-563, "Investigation of S-IV All
Bymte_s Yehicle Explon_on", 5eptenber 1964.
8O
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Case Study #2" Second Stage- Development Plan Changes ,
a. Description of the Situation 23,24
MSFC management had recognized early in Saturn
program planning that the development of the second stage
for the lunar launch vehicle would pose one of the
major problems. Difficulties were foreseen and did
occur in such areas as material selection, welding
procedures, choice of insulation and its installation,
structural demands and others. All problems were
amplified by the first large-scale use of the supercold
propellant liquid hy¢ rogen.
Initial plans had therefore provided for one flight
with a "dummy" (nonpropelled) second stage. Such a
launch would give the contractor a little more time for
the development of a "live" flight stage. It also would
save money in case critical flight anomalies occurred
during the propulsive phase of the first stage, which was
simultaneously undergoing its first flight mission in
the same launch.
Triggered by criticism that NASA had. to undergo
in connection with a series of Saturn-I flights with
dummy upper stages, the Associate Administrator for
_' Manned Space Flight decided late in !963 to apply an
L .
"all-up" test philosophy to the Saturn-V development.
Such "all-up" testing provided for the use of "live," i.e.
propulsive upper stages from the beginning, and excludes
accordingly the use of "dummy" stages. Such daring
approach had been made possible by the tremendous progress
which had occurred in rocketry, as demonstrated by these
events _ Approximately a month after the "all up"
decision, the first Saturn I with a live upper stage
orbited a record payload of 37j900 pounds. The first
ntage of this launch vehicle had proven itself in this i
23) David S. Akens, "Saturn _llustrated Chronology", MSFC,
MHR-5, January 20, 1971.
24) David S. Akons, "An Illustrated Chronology of MSF¢,"
MSFC,MHR-IO, May 1974. _-
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as well as in all previous flights. Especially the
, much debated question as to the suitability and viability
of the "cluster concept" had been demonstrated by this
series of successful flights, which was now considered
safe for use in the first and second stages of the
Saturn V. The decision to use liquid hydrogen as fuel
for all upper Saturn stages had created the problem of
non-availability of upper-stage systems for early flights.
The decision alternatives for management were to either
fly with "dummy" upper stages or to postpone flight-
testing until advanced propulsion systems had become
available. The latter approach would not have provided
any flight data at the time when the "all-up" testing
decision was made. Sin_e early Saturn management had
foreseen such timing problems, it had decided to adopt
the approach of flying dummy upper stages in order to
get the large booster program under way and to obtain
preliminary flight data. The availability of positive
test information from these early flights puts Apollo
Program management now in a position to wait for the
availability of the second stage, and to forego the
use of a "dummy" second stage. Use of "dummies" for
. the third stage had never been considered, since this
i stage was being flown on the Saturn-lB launch vehicle,
thereby demonstrating its flightworthiness prior to
its use for the lunar mission.
b. Implementation of the "_I!-Up" Approach
The decision for "all-up" flight testing caused a
review and re-alignment of the entire development hardware
of the second stage. The "dummy" stage, which was
already under construction, was converted into a flight
unit.
An already scheduled non flight stage for test j
1
firings (S-II-T) took on increased importance. Addition
of a new test element to the development plan was considered i
to demonstrate the acceptability of one of the inecessary
most critical design features of the second stage s
I t
the "common bulkhead" separating the two propellants l
3a 1
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in the tankage. This unit became subsequently known as
the "CBTT" Common Bulkhead Test Tax, k.
Parallel to these efforts a "Battleship"Unit was
being prepared for hot firings to study engine operations,
combustion exhaust gas interactions, shut-off procedures,
etc. This "Battleship" had an entirely different tank
configuration, consisting of 2 individual tanks for the
2 propellants; therefore, it did not have to cope with
the common bulkhead problem. This unit became ready
for testing in mld-1965, and was gradually increasing
engine burn times after a series of short duration
"ignition tests" had been run. These same tests were
repeated later on with flight-type engines of the latest
production run.
The need for ample test hardware was emphasized by
the recent explosion (early 1964) of the "All-Systems"
test vehicle in Sacramento, California. (See Case Study
#1). Th_s "All-Systems-Vehicle" had been used extensively
in an almost completed test series. The incident
demonstrated to management the vulnerability of all
hardware used in test firings and the need for back-up
systems. Contractual realignments considered this experience
" in the changed requirements.
, c. A Special Test Fixture
The actual construction of his new CBTT fixture for
: testing of the common bulkhead design under liquid
hydrogen temperature conditions had to wait for the
design freeze of the second stage_ stnce the CBTT
was a shortened version of the full-length S-II tankage.
i
Parallel to the design and construction of the stage, a
special test facility had to be built for structural
tests with propellants, applying the simulated thrust of
J
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the 5 engines to the thrust structure as well as internal
tank loads simulating flight acceleration. Material
selection, welding techniques, and all manufacturing
processes were duplicated from the regular production
met,mds for the flight hardware. This duplication
should assure that all obtained test data would be
representative of the actual flight items themselves.
Cryogenic testing with this unit demonstrated
the integrity of the common bulkhead design, the forward
skirt, and the tank wall joints. The initially planned
test program for the CBTT was completed in late 1965.
The CBTT found further use in 1966 when management
directed that this unit should be used to test structural
repair methods, primarily the bolted doublers being used
to reinforce certain areas of the hydrogen tank. In
mid-September, this direction was extended to include
the installation and the testing of the redesigned
feedline elbows of the hydrogen lines. In one of these
tests the CBTTwas finally destroyed when the hydrogen
tank ruptured during a pressure test to certify some
of these design features of these new elements. The
final failure occurred in the area around a recirculation
pump boss, which might have been overstressed during one
or more of the many special runs made with the unit.
d. Management Appraisal
The CB_ had well served its original purpose and
had provided extended service for an additional set of
runs for ancillary components attached to the tankage.
Management decided not to replace the CBTT, as all
primary testing had been completed. It had been planned
prior to the failure to continue use of the CBTT for
feedline elbow testing. It was determined that these
tests could be continued with the "Battleship" and other
t
test facilities.
I 'I
t
_ 34 i _i ,
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This rather simple CBTT unit provided a wealth of
data for structural and general test engineers and made
thereby a major contribution to the success of the
launch vehicle program. Its rather late inclusion
in the development plan attests to the flexibility that
management displayed at all times. The introduction of
the "all-up" test philosophy is another demonstration
of management flexibility. This introduction generated
exhaustive discussions on its merits, but the final
success of the lunar program as well as the cost savings
by deletion of one complete Saturn flight have by now
amply proven the correctness of this decision.
Flexibility of program planning is furthermore demonstrated
by the availability of the "Battleship" at the critical
times when mishaps occurred with other test or flight
hardware. An early beginning of test firings can uncover
i hidden problems and contributes to the implementation of
the groundrule to "leave no stone unturned." The extensive
use of the CBTT is another demonstration of the same
philosophy. It is the manager's task to encourage his team
to make such recommendations from the working level. He
has to propose such program elements to higher level
_ management, who may often be inclined to save expenditures,
or costly,efforts, and who have to be convinced of the need
to proceed as proposed. ,
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Case Study #3: Continuing Second Stage Development Problems
a. Description of the Situation 23'24
Some of the _arly development problems with the Second
Stage were sketched in the previous case study. Due to the
described development plan changes, the availability of a test
stage had become t_e pacing item. Such a stage was supposed to
demonstrate by static firings the flightworthiness of the second
stage. For this purpose it was to be built according to the
latest design of a flight article. It was given the name S-II-T.
When such test article finally became available, damage had
just occurred to a structural test stage, which was scheduled
for subsequent use in MSFC's dynamic test facility. Due to the
overriding urgency of dynamic Saturn V testing, the MSFC Stage
Manager had to request the contractor to study a program plan
which would provide for the use of the S-II-T for the dynamic
.: facility. Other ground rules of this request were that any
S-II-T modifications would be done at the test site; a flight
stage would be used to activate the Flight Acceptance Test
Stand rather than the S-II-T stage; no test stand constraints would
be imposed on the flight stage of the first Saturn flight.
Battleship Test Program reorientation would be accomplished in
accordance with the recommendations of the MSFC assignment team
currently at the contractor siee.
The presence of this special task team at the contractor site
assisted the stage manager considerably in the timely solution
of the problems.
_'3) David S. Akens, "Saturn Illustrated Chronology", MSFC,
MHR-5, January 20, 1971.
24) David S Akens,. "An Illustrated Chronology of MSFC,"
MSFC, _IR-IO, May 1974.
i
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This request emphasized the fact that many questions
in regard to development problems were still wide open and
had to be solved before the stage would be acceptable
for a Saturn V flight. Continuing schedule corrections
and adjustments became necessary to make up for encountered
slippages and to prevent bad. delays in the Saturn V
program. This situation led top echelon contractor
management to assign a top-notch, well-seasoned stage
manager, and to the simultaneous transfer of 300
engineering personnel to office trailers at the manufacturing
site at Seal Beach, California, the final assembly site
of.all stage production and assembly activities. Such
a drastic step appeared necessary to assure faster
corrective actions by design changes in response to
manufacturing difficulties. This need for closer ties
finally necessitated the relocation of all engineering
activities into a new plant to be constructed at Seal
Beach.
The S_II-T stage could finally be filled for the
first time with actual propellants after repair of minor
discrepancies.The first short duration (15 see.) firing
took place with only small anomalies. A successful 150-
second test followed, and a full-duration test of more
than 350_econds duration was made on May 20, 1966.
b. Occurrence of Test Anomaly
Maintenance testing after the successful run in
preparation of follow-on firings led to destruction of
the S-II-T Stage on May 28, 1966. The hylrogen tank
had been pressurized with helium gas in an effort to
isolate leakages that had caused a fire around a
recirculation pump. There was fortunately no liquid
hydrogen in the tank when it ruptured. The failure
resulted from propagation of a small fracture in a
raised boss. This happened at a pressure which was
considerably lower than the-ultimate design value. : /
This incident led to Inspection of all stages
with the intent to discover similar "cracks." iJ
J
J I
1975006561-040
1 I l 1i
; Especially hydrogen tanks were checked because of the
"i
temperature problems, Other cracks were found, and an
intensive investigation was started to determine when
these had occurred, and under what specific conditions.
This activity led to an intensive follow-on effort of
"fracture mechanics" investigations, which it would lead
too far to discuss in any detail here at this time.
c. Management Measures
The MSFC Stage manager requested the contractor to
propose a recovery plan. Those test objectives which had
still to be accomplished were to be assigned to Battleship
testing as well as to the first two flight stage
acceptance runs. This was a very unusual step for MSFC
test philosophies, and is indicative of the predic%ment
The recovery plan was approved in July 1966.
It removed previously existing time reserves completely,
and extended the dwell times of the first two flight
stages at the Mississippi Test Facility to permit the
additional test activities to satisfy the remaining
test requirements.
This accident also led to the approval of a
"Confidence Improvement Program" which was based on work
by a "Structural Assessment Team", which consisted of
, MSFC specialists in the areas of design, materials
manufacturing, inspection, testing, and other vital
areas. ':
The efforts of this rather small and unofficial
"Assessment Team" led finally to the highly effective
"Tiger Team", which was dispatched in early January 1967.
Their mission was to improve the time cycle of design
approval_ ,to agree on remedial actions for discrepancies,
new test plans and inspection methods, and to handle
many things which just wasted too much time by routing
through routine approval channel_. MSFC personnel were
assigned to these duties on a tem_,orary, but extended time
basis. The Deputy Director of MSF_ spent a considerable
amount of time himself on these fullctions. This fact
supported the actions of the "Tiger Team" "tremendously.
Such high level support assured _._t also the new contractor
$8
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management was lending full support to these "Tiger Team"
tasks. This "&'a_apparently the only way to expedite
these often drastic, and always cumbersome changes
and modifications.
d. Conclusions
The final success of the Apollo Program, as well
as the excellent flight performance of all second
stages speaks well for the implemented remedies. This
action turned out as real teamwork. The endeavour to be
of greatest possible benefit to the program was uppermost
in everyone's mind. It was often difficult to distinguish
between contractor personnel and between the Civil Service
people. They had all the same goal, and both parties were
doing their utmost to bring the stage development to the
desirable end. After initial difficulties it turned
• out to be an outstanding example of true team spirit and
cooperation.
This case study shows that often even the pre-planned
contingencies will not suffice. Thi_ then are the instances
when the manager has to take the lead and exert special
efforts to arrive at acceptable solutions. The events
- of this case study led to superb team-work which solved
a most d%fficult situation. Management succeeded to
instill the necessary spirit to overcome one of the
m
biggest hurdles. Such special task teams became almost
a way of life for many critical events throughout the
Apollo program.
39 i
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Case Study #4: Engine control Box Problems
a. Description of Situa£ion
The hydrogen fueled engines of the Saturn Upper Stages
created a new set of requirements which had not been
encountered before: All engine components had to
remain functional during extended space operations at low
temperatures (-130°C); They had to be turned on for operation
in an accurately specified sequence from an electric
controller, called "Electrical Control Assembly-ECA".
The engines had to be "man-rated_
The initial design concept of the ECA was based on
the use of high-reliability components as developed for
the Air Force Minuteman program, but used otherwise
standard design and test specifications applied for
ECA manufacture. The assembled ECA's were functionally
tested at -130°C and given a vibration shake-down test.
The unaccessibility of components in the LJtted assemblies
caused high f_brication cost, which led to a series of
redesigns. Printed wiring boards, improved soldering,
i and more accurate ignition exciters and timers were
I
combined with the requirement that the vendor had to do
the qualification.
° Many app_mently minor, but very significant improve-
ments in component selection, circuit board construction
and soldering techniques, addition of heat sinks and better '
assembly methods finally improved the ECA sufficiently for
manned flight. Fortunately, all ECA anomalies could
be identified during checkout, static firing, or special
ground testing, and never occurred during Saturn flights.
b. Typical Anomalies
An ECA failure during lau_,_h site checkout in June
1966 focussed top level management attention on the situation.
The cause of the failure was a fractured solder joint.
An inordinately high number of defective timers began to
appear in ECA acceptance testing by late 1966.
i 4O i
t
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During a hot engine firing in February 1967 at the
Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) premature cutoff
' was given. Failure analysis revealed that the malfunction
was caused by a piece of loose safety wire within the ECA
assembly.
c. Management Remedies
A_ a result of the failure at t_DC, management
decided to return all flight ECA's to the engine contractor
for internal inspection. This measure led to a complete
revamping of the manufacturing assembly area, specific
contamination prevention measures and personnel awareness
training. Special assembly booths were established.
These were not located in the board soldering area to
preclude inadvertant introduction of wire ends into the
assemblies. Scrap-retention pliers and strict safety-
wire "tag-end" accountability processes were invoked.
Detailed inspection steps for verifying cleanliness of
the ECA prior to installation of the _CA enclosure werc
documented and added to assembly operations req_Lirements.
In order to solve the many other soldering problems,
a special procedure was imposed on all ECA assemblies:
Critical solder joints were inspected at 20-fold magnification
for cracks and stress prior to and after thermal exposure
6
to -200°F. This thermal "culling" process was retained
until different requirements obviated this test rather
late in ECA production.
Failure analysis and test programs resulted in
improved plating and terminal dimensions for solder joints
and led to a controlled laminating process for the boards,
which substantially reduced rejections.
Of considerable program significance was the complete
renovation and upgrading of the entire soldering operation
at all contractor plants. A thoroug'.., review of specifications,
training, equipment, and techniques brought about a "clean- i
up" campaign. New process specifications and training [
manuals were published; personnel were re-trained; equip-
i
ment was standardized, upgraded and calibrated; soldering i
oriteria and inspection records were invoked, i
i
....., ............. 41
1975006561-044
Soldering quality on ECA;s and many other items of flight
hardware has been maintained since at highest workmanship
levels.
d. Appraisal of _M.anagement Measures
The ECA became a management concern as a potential
weak link in the Saturn launch vehicle about mid-1966.
The inherent lack of design redundancy might prevent
the engine to start. _SFC management considered several
approaches to solve this critical problem, including a
completely new redundant design. However, since this
system could not be built and tested in time for early
manned missions, it was rejected. Accordingly, _aanagement
decided to monitor test results of the new ECA design
very closely to insure attainment of an acceptable level of
reliability or risk. It was decided to work the problem
real hard and to eliminate all potential failures by
steps for additional tightening of manufacturing processes
and quality control, retro-fitting and recycling from the
! field. Since the sequence timers were the most critical
single point failure iter., in the ECA, redundant timers
were eventually introduced on late Saturn flight vehicles.
: In r@trospect, it appears that these measures of
great detail attention were effective in obtaining satis-
$
factory flight reliability, as indicated by the fact that
no flight failures ever occurred. A requirement from the
very beginning for a redund,_ut system would have elim._inated
much of the concern, although it is assumed that failures
would have had about the same amount of management attention
regardless of the redundancy, One of the most predominant
factors in the way the design evolved probably was influenced
by the fact that the engine contractor had only a limited
i amount of expert_.se in the electronics field which may ihave acc unted for the necessity of several designs, i
The approach for the Shuttle Engine controller will j
reflect the lessons learned from the above indicated
problems, Requirements for full redundancy and n__osingle I
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po:nt failure modes were established as an engine control
requirement. Also a well experienced subcontractor in the
eluct_onics field was selected to handle the design
and production of the control system on the engine.
This case study is a typical demonstratioD of action
oriented monitoring and controlling by the manager even
down to the component level of a subassembly. It also
shows cxearly the impact that remedial measures can have
on other associated areas of the project. The manager
assures by suitable reviews"that no stone is left unturned"
and that all aspects of the failures as well as the
proposed improvements are examined in depth. All
actions and implemented remedies demonstrate also
a typical team operation. A major rewrite of handbooks and
specifications was implemented to assure that future projects
will obtain the benefits from the lessons learned.
Many of these remedial actions were taken by lower-
level managers and technicians. However, the final and
most drastic measures were directives from top management.
This indicates the depth of penetration which often becomes
necessary for the successfully managed program. The
initial "visibility" for top management had been poor,• bu became entirely adequate fter the problem had been
recognize_. The implemented remedies made a major contribution• to improved reliability of all ongoing and future NASA ,
programs.
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Case Study #5: Flight Stage Explosion 33
Description of Event
6n Jam'a_y 20, 1967, a hot firing of a third stage flight
unit was to demonstrate proper functioning of all electric
and pneumatic systems.
Although all monitored systems operated nominally according
to the instruments and records, the stage exploded 11 seconds
before simulated liftoff, i.e. well prior to its owr. ignition command.
The explosion destroyed the flight stage completely and
- damaged the Test Facility severely. Fortunately, due to the
built-in safety-provisions, no personnel injt, ry occurred.
However, the fact that this was the second explosion of a third
Stage on a Douglas Sacramento Test stand focussed special attention
on it.
Ma._agement Action
Immediately upon receiving the report on the explosion, the
Director of MSFC as the responsible NASA Center, established a
Board of Inquiry under the director of the Kennedy Space Center as
chairman. The following committees were formed to support the
investigation :
a) Data Protection and Inventory
b) Documentation Review
c) Crew Procedure, Operation, and Safety
d) Personnel Interviews
#
e) Damage Assessment and Mapping
f) Cause Isolation Investigation
g) Photggraphs
J
33)Most facts of this summary have been abstracted from MAOOI-OO5-
211p in MSFC SATURN V semi-annual progress report Jan.l_ t67-
June 30, 1967,
4
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The contractor established also its own investigative
group, especially geared to replanning of follow-on activities,
the immediate implementation of re_edi,1 measures and support
of the N?SA activities.
Determination Of Failure Cause.
Preliminary debris analysis had already indicated that
apparently one of the eight high pressure helium spheres which are
mounted on the thrust structure of the stage had failed.
For weight reasons these spheres are constructed from titaniun and
are just prior to launch pressurized to more than 3000 psia.
The helium gas has to repressurize the liquid oxygen for restart of
the engine in orbit. It was subsequently determined that the
subcontractor had inafl'- rtently welded a few spheres with improper
welding rods (pure Tit_.ium instead of a titanium alloy). After
thorough examination of all facts, the Board of Inquiry concluded
that this improper production method was the cause for the rupture
of the helium pressure vessel. Otherwise, the investigation
showed that test planning and execution had been done in a
professional manner, and that all stage, test, and ground
support systems performed in accordance with established
specifications up to the moment of the explosion. The Board
determined that the operating personnel could not have predicted
or prevented the incident on the basis of the displayed and
available information. Apparently all lessons learned from the
previous explosion had been applied and proper steps had been
$-
implemented.
Implementation of Remedial Steps
As a result of the explosion, a "Helium Bottle Investigation
_rogram" was initiated to _emedy the shortcomings encountered during
the acceptance test. In this program, the contractor was
required to conduct a series of burst tests wlth weld-discrepant
and wlth _on-dlscrepant bottles. These tests with discrepant
bottles indicated after burst tests to failure the formation of
titanium hydrides In the mlcro-structure of the pure welds.
1
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t It is known that massive hydride precipitates cause weakness ini
, the metal structure.
i Even though the evidence was not entirely conclusive,
i SATURN program management decided to replace all bottles whichhad been welded with pure titanium wire. MSFC's traceability
: records made this readily possible. Fortunately, this affected
only titanium bottles which had been fabricated with filler
welds due to the wall thickness of the wall material.
The "cold helium" bottles, which store the helium inside the
stage's liquid hydrogen tank - and are therefore, much less
accessible - do not have filler welds and were therefore not
affected by the replacement or re-checking program.
As a measure of additional assurance, all existing
ambient helium storage bottles were subjected to eddy current
testing to determine the soundness of their welds.
The acceptance Test Stand had been extensively damaged
from the explosion, as was documented in considerable detail
by the Board of Inquiry. The stage manager approved a stsnd
reactivation program, consisting of several phases.
The actual refurbishment of the stand began during thei
t last full week in Lay, 1967. The contractor undertook with his
own personnel the refurbishment of all ground support and test
equipment. Some items could be restored to a serviceable
_ operating condition; much destroyed equipment had to be replaced.
The stand was back in operation by late 1967. ,
The loss of this stage caused stage management to implement
a re-allocations and/or redesignation program for all affected
stages.
Conclusion
?,
After thorough review of all remedial measures to be
implemented as well as extensive rescheduling plans, Apollo/
SATURN Program management announced that this incident in itself
would neither delay the first manned Apollo flight nor, _ _
Z
J
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the lunar landing. This announcement could be made
although many ongoing activities connected with the launch
vehicle development were impacted to a considerable degree.
One fact that aided greatly was the "traceability" 0£
components and materials, which showed that only very few
pressure vessels were produced with the improper welding
techniques. The helium spheres in launch vehicle SA-204
were, for example, no__tt affected; however, it was concluded
to inspect these pressure vessels anyway prior to launch.
The lesson from this mishap is that traceability
of components, and even their manufacturing process will
be very helpful in case of accidents. It may during these
critical times well pay for the added expense for such
"traceability" records. In any case, the high degree of
"visibility" and confidence that is existing for decision-
making is definitely a strong asset. It certainly enabled
the manager in this instance to issue firm directives in
time for the continuation of the program. The cost of
"traceability" records must be weighed against the
possibility of failures and major mishaps and their
potential impact on the program. It appears that in a
difficult and nationally prestigious program with firm
schedules like in Saturn/Apollo, the benefits are well
worth the cost.
These _ase studies also demonstrate how responsibilities
assigned to task groups (Board of Inquiry) can assist the ,
manager in a quick and efficient manner. This method
provides great flexibility in management and organizational
arrangements.
47
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1Case Study #6: POGO Problems
a. Summary of the Problem _
The second prototype of a lunar launch vehicle Saturn
AS-502 performed an apparently successful flight in April 1968.
Only post-flight evaluation showed as one of the critical
anomalies of this flight a pronounced "Pq_o"-effect, a dyna-
mically unstable longitudinal oscillation of the launch ve-
hicle propulsion system, produced by coupling of the vibra-
tions generated by the rocket engine combustion with ttle
inherent frequencies of the propellant feed system, and the
vehicle structure. Such energy coupling is undesirable for
the structural elements and unacceptable to the crew if ex-
cessive. It has been compared with the annoying feedback
squeal encountered when the microphone and the loud speaker
9
of a public address system are coupled.
No such Pogo effect had been observed on the previous
flight prototype vehicle Saturn AS-501, which was the very
first launch of a Saturn V and had taken place in November
of the preceeding year. Extensive analytical and experimen-
tal studies had been conducted prior to flight and static
testing of the Saturn Y system. All results promised that
this detrimental event would not occur in Saturn V flights,
although the limits of safety were not so great that this
possibility could not be ruled out entirely. However, the
engineering team felt pretty confident about the results of
the theoretical analyses when Pogo occurred neither in the
first launch nor in the many static firings of the Booster.
All static firings were conducted under simulated conditions
as closely as they could be obtained in these static firing
tests.
± n n i n
9) See reference # 9. Speech by Lt. Ge_. Sam C. Phillips, USAF,
Apollo Program Director at Miami Beach, Fla. on May 20, 1969 J
on "Management of Large _esearch and Development Programs".
4s i
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lThis feeling of security was amplified, by the situation that
no Pogo effect had ever occurred in any of the previous Red-
stone, Jupiter, or Saturn I and Saturn TB flights. The de-
{ sign principles of the basic combustion sy:_tems, the propellants,
and the propellant feed systems were very _imilar in concepts.
Therefore, a problem of this type had. really not bee- _,pected,
although other programs had been haunted by Pog_ effects to
considerable degree.
When this anomaly occurred on As-502, immediate remedies
became a matter of urgency for the entire Agency, esp,cially
the Saturn Booster development Agency, the MSFC, which was
reaffirmed as being responsible for the lead by the Apollo
Program Director.
To prevent the occurrence of Pogo in time for the third
Saturn V flight, which was then scheduled for December of that
same year, became of prime importance since it had been ten-
tatively considered to m..xe it a manned flight. This could
be accomplished o_ly when all indications of the implementcd
countermeasures did clearly indicate that the Pogo problem
had been overcome. The problem was one of magnitude, since
the savings accomplished by one less flight test vehicle
amounted to several hundred million dollars. Attainment of
the Apollo _oal to accomplish the lunar landing during the
decade would- be enhanced greatly, if the solution to the
problem could be accomplished in time for the next flight. °
Otherwise, the larger number of launch vehicles required
to meet the predicted. Apollo time schedule would be gravely
endangered..
b. Management Approach to a Solution
The Apollo Program Director summarized the implemented
action as follows 9:
. . . "As a consequence, the Apollo team took immediate i
action. The Marshall Space Flight Center was reaffirmed as
9) Ibid, page 7 J
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responsible for the lead, in a total vehicle sense, in the
resolution of the problem. The Marshall POGO working group
was reactivated. It was made up of senior prople from
Marshall, the Manned Spacecraft Center, the Langley Research
Center and the first stage contractors contractors, who in
past years had experienced this problem on other vehicles,
like Titan, were brought in. To insure good liaison between
centers, representatives were exchanged between Houston and
Huntsville. An astronaut was assigned full time to the
working group, as was my Deputy Director. A total of
about 700 professional people from Government and industry
contributed to the effort".
With these guidelines and instructions from NASA Head-
quarters, the Deputy Director of MSFC, took it upon himself
to head this effort. He got all necessary resources assigned
to a task which would definitely tax the existlng organization
greatly, but which needed to be done if major consequences
to the Saturn-Apollo program were to be avoided.
The "Pogo Working Group" was to coordinate all associated
activities, to assure that all vital areas are being studied
to coordinate intermediate results, and to arrive at the
final recommendations to be presented to the Apollo program
manager for his approval. The working group consisted mostly
of MSFC and other NASA personnel, who were delegated to this
job on a temporary basis until an acceptable solution had °
been found. Their activities were supported by a sizeable
contractor team, who were assigned specific tasks for quick
and timely resolution. These contractor teams called on the
Aerospace Corporation, The Being Company, The Martin-Marietta
Corporation, and TRW-Systems.
The tasks assigned to the working group called for a
sizable effort and included to: 1) understand the reasons
for this surprising event, to 2) propose suitable counter- i
measures, to 3) test these measures for their efficiency, i
and to 4) select the best suited approach, to 5) build and
' 50 I
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test the necessary hardware, to 6) install it in the next
flight vehicle without any major change in the flight schedule.
Detailed reviews were held at the contractors plants at
the stage and engine test sites, at the MSFC Field Center,
and. in NASA-Headquarters. Many other top NASA leaders paid
full attention to the ongoing activities, monitored theoreti-
cal results, test data, conclusions, and the final recommen-
dations. In the final review, the Apollo Program Director
concluded, that the propused measures would provide a timely
' and. acceptable solution and. the necessary safety margin to
man the next vehicle as well as to eventually assure a safe
journey to a moon landing, He said about f_e_e reviews
himself the following: "My primary emphasis during this
time period was on frequent review of progress. Included
were a review of Apollo 6 initial results, five technical
working group reviews and regular status reviews by telecon
network. For the telecon network reviews the three manned
space flight centers and my Washington Program Office are
tied together by telephone. The information under dis-
cussion is displayed on screens at all four locations. This
procedure has proved to be a very effective way of communi-
- caring the total wealth of information being developed in a
, dynamic way to all interested parties".
The technical solution to the POGO problem was fortunately
#
rather simple. It was found, by the _any parallel efforts that
the already existing 5 prevalves in the oxidizer lines leading
to the 5 F-1 engines of the Saturn's V first stage could be
utilized to charge gaseous helium onto the system. An annular
cavity in the housing of this prevalve could be used for this
purpose. The presence of the gaseous helium provides suffic-
ient "springiness" to the oxydizer feed system that it will
decouple the effect of the engine's combustion vibrations on
4
the longitudinal exitations of the structure. It was fortun-
ate that the prevalves had been included in the Saturn V first i
stage, although they had no specific flight function. They
t
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had only been provided for ground testing so that in case
of engine malfunction, the main oxydizer flow could be _hut
off. This "prevalve accumulator" (PVA) became the key
element in reducing suction line frequenca, and thereby
decoupling the engine-structures oscillations. Helium _-
could be supplied during the flight from an existing _
[on-board source, and the required amount was rather nominal.
The PVA operational sequence begins before lift-off at about
I0 minutes before launch, so that the PVA cavities aru filled
I
with hnlium gas by the time of exidizer tank pressurization.
At that moment, they are slightly compressed, but still
sufficiently filled with gaseous helium to accomplish the
. vital job of frequency reduction during flight. A much more
detailed description of the system with diagrams and a
historical background is given in reference.
c. Final Management _leasures
As a great surprise to many engineers and in spite of
extensive analyses and verifying test results prior to actual
flights, the POGO anomaly did occur on the second launch
of the Saturn/Apollo launch vehicle. The entire Apollo
team was called into action to solve the problem. It was
fortunate that a quick solution could be found based on the
eztensive analysis which had taken place earlier.
Management saw to it that necessary manpower resources P
were made available on short notice and were organized as
"task teams"; they had the wholehearted support of all
re.
management levels. Overtime, travel, shifting of less
: important endeavors, addition of supporting contracts, _
] and other measures could be implemented on shortest notice,
I
quite contrary to the usual civil service procedures and
regulations.
" Potential remedies were discussed on the highest levels
of management, ,nd were not merely left to the discretion of
the working level people and their resources. The final
recommendations were presented to top-management fox' review t
J
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detailed discussion of possible pitfalls, and for final
acceptance.
Fortunately, all these steps could be taken in time and
were successful. The next Saturn flight could be manned and
i carried Commander Frank Box'man and his crew to a circumlunar
mission during Christmas of that same year.
Even after this successful flight had shown that the
POGO problem had principally been solved, all subsequent
vuhieles were continued to be :.onitored closely as to
combus%.!vn vibrations and structural response characteristics.
These measures were extended to the vehicles of the Skylab
and ApolIo-SOYUZ Programs.
Such detailea flight data combined with ground test
information led the Saturn Program Manager to
recommend shut-down of the center engine in the second stage
before final cut-off in order to overcome a slight POGO
indication which had shown up in the fllght records of
Apollo 8 and Apollo 9 missions. After thorough evaluation
of all evidence, the Apollo Program Director accepted the
recommendation and decided to switch off the center engine
about 80 seconds early.
A captive firing test of an identical stage was
successfully terminated early without adverse affects and
supported the decision. To compensate for the thrc_t
loss of the fifth engine the Saturn V guidance system was
reprogrammed to steer in accordance with the "engine-out"
I
plan, and to burn the 4 outboard engines about 15 sec. longer.
34
d. Conclusion
The POGO problem was just one of many similar "unscheduled
events" which happened during the conduct of the Apollo
program. Thorough analysts of available data, an educated
appraisal of their significance by experienced teams, and
' decisive management action to overcome the situation made
it possible that the lunar landing could by accomplished
_ring the next summer, well within the predicted schedule.
' 34) Erich E. 6oerner, Lox Prevalve to Prevent Pogo Effect
! on Saturn 5", Space/Aeronautics, December 1968, Volume i
50, Number 7, page 72 ft.
1
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Case Study #7. Igniter line Problems.
a. Description of Event.
The last flight of an unmanned Saturn vehicle was cursed
with another serious malfunc£ion besides the POGO problem
which was just discussed in the previous case study. It took
much engineering analys_s of the flight records to trace the
problem to the sparkplu_ igniter line for the main engines_
which provide propulsion for the second the third stages of
the lunar launch vehicle. Both stages use liquid hydrogen as
fuel, which caused a part of the encountered difficulties.
Details of the events of the flight connected with this
problem have been described in a contractor report, which has
28
been quoted in available open literature. The initial indicat-
ions from the flight records provided jl_st tBe information
that the environment around the augmented spark-plug igniter
(ASI) line was excessively and unexplainably cold. No reason
for such conditions could be immediately determined from the
other flight data.
Fortunately for the Apollo program, the boos*er controls
could compensate for the erratic operation of the propulsion
system, mostly due to the POGO effect, but also affected by
this malfunction. The resiliency of the Saturn System could
successfully put the third stage and the unmanned spacecraft
prototype into a low earth orbit, as planned for this specific
unmanned mission. This fact aided greatly in isolating the
causes of this problem.
28) Beirne Lay, Jr, "Earthbound Astronauts'_ page 140; . !
' (1971). Prentice-Hall, Into
*
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b. Determination of Failure Cause
Since similarly low temperatures had never been recorded in
previous flights or ground testing, management d¢'- :d to
establish a special task team to track down the exact "reason for
these temperature conditions, to support any conclusions by
ground test demonstrations, and to propose remedial solutions.
In a seven-6ay-a-week, around-the-clock effort, the
problem v:as solved in a timely manner by assigning all available
resources to these activities, and to declsme them as having
top priority. Contractor and Government engineers went over
all drawings and interface documents. Quality control people
studied workmansl.ip and acceptability of all involved parts
and components, especially those located close to the ASI
line, where the low temperatures had been recorded.
Failure analysis indicated that a ruptured ASI line could
cause the observed drop in temperatures. However, in spite
of an endless number of test firings, the ASI line failure
could not be demonstrated during these tests, although
flow rates were increased to very abnormal values, and gaseous
nitrogen was forced into the propellant flow to stimulate
vibrations. Two teams were working on the problems. One team
represented the second stage of the Saturn vehicle, and used
r
, five engines in all tests, while the other team simulated
the third stage operation, and run only the one engine
representative of that stage. Although the ASI line was
fmd to have operating points sensitive to certain vibration
frequencies, it could not be made to fail.
Only by meticulous duplication of space conditions in a
very elaborate test fixture and operation in vacuum could the
ASI line failures finally be duplicated. Under these very
special conditions, eight of the tested ASI lines failed within
less than 100 seconds. The flight failure had been duplicated
by attention to infinite detail, and very careful and
painstaking duplication of space conditions. Simulation to
such a degree is normally not required to obtain representative i
: 55 i
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test data. Additional testing found that at ground pressure,
the ambient air liquefied and was hiding the trouble. This
protection of the line bellows by the frost formation does not
occur in the greater altitudes with very low ambient pressure=,
where the engine is reignited after a lengthy coast period.
It took the engineers cnly 30 days to accomplish the many
• steps summarized above. This was only possible by strong
support by all management levels.
c. Remedial Actions
Fortunately, for a timely continuation of the Apollo program,
the "fix" was very simple and could be accomplished quickly.
It was just necessary to eliminate the use of bellows
altogether, and to use an alternate routing of the ASI line
to its designation by means of a few loops instead of the
bellows. This solution to the problem had been obtained by
diligent attention to detail, and all follow-on Apollo/Saturn
upper stages would be modified accordingly for successful
completion of all forthcoming booster missions. Management's
insistence on a plausible and acceptable explanation for the
- surprising flight data certainly prevented future mission
failures based on an inadequat_ igniter line design.
This case study is also an excellent example of strong
team spirit, leadership on several levels and outstanding
motivation to get to the bottom of problems.
Management certainly earned its pay in this instance,
since the problem was hidden and not easily visible.
Conunications up and down the line were excellent and
contributed to the solution. Once the shortcoming had been
uncovered, very definite and positive action was directed.
f
r
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Case Study #8: Stress Corrosion Problems
Stress corrosion, as it was encountered with the Saturn
launch vehicles, is an example of a problem handled essentially
by the engineering level.
Top management paid attention to this problem only in the
final stages of the program when such problems were discovered
at the launch site.
a. Discovery of Initial Anomaly
A control actuator failure occurred early in the program
during an engine test. Subsequent inspection revealed that this
malfunctioL was caused by the use of stress corrosion susceptible
material for the actuator housings and other parts of the actuator.
The MSFC laboratories were fully aware of the problem of
stress corrosion. The ideal situation would have been to avoid
by design all stress corrosion susceptible materials completely.
These materials are affected by their environment, are "time
oriented", and are dependent upon the dynamic structural loads
while in the critical environment. Considerations must also be
given to the way a particular material is processed, such as
heat-treating. The designer is often forced on the basis of
excellent strength, cost, weight, and delivery considerations to
- work with some of these susceptible materials. In such instances,
the designer completes a strc3s corrosion analysis based on all infor-
mation known to him for all the critical parts that would be
subject to stress corrosion.
57
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b. Initial Remedial Action
As a result of finding this initial anomaly, the materials
group recommended an effort to cl-_ate "visibility" by i_cntifying
all stress corrosion susceptible materials that were used in
critical applications on the launch v_nicle. These criticality
analyses determined the manner in which a part was manufactured
and the stresses that it was exposed to in the application. These
analyses categorized also the various components of the vehicle
as to their criticality to the overall mission performance of the
vehicle. In those cases where a component was identified as critical
to the vehicle funczion, special inspections were made mandatory
on a periodic basis. Quality control people were given special
training on the discovery and analysis of cracks found during
these inspections. This action was accomplished by NASA as well
as contractor personnel, and was normally covered under the
basic contract obligations, which permitted implementation on a
rather informal basis.
In addition to these routine inspections, NASA conducted inde-
pendent tests to confirm the analytical results obtained by the
contractor. In this way, a good understanding of the extent of
the problem was reached.
: A major effort was initiated to avoid the stress corrosion
i susceptible material by design changes. Whenever the material
problem could not be resolved, special processing of the
material was defined in the specifications, which for the most
part improved the situation.
r
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c. Discovery of Additional Problems
Durin_ a routine inspection of one of the manned Skylab
Vehicles on the launch pad, an inspector discovered a crack in the
stabilization fin of the first stage. He recorded his findings and
had others re-inspect the fin. Because of the criticality of the
part, materials specialists visited the launch site for additional
analysis. They confirmed that there were cracks in the fin. This
included some castings which were part of the fin. The location
was critical for the flight of the vehicle and the success of
the mission. The salt atmosphere at the launch site was a
definite influence to which the vehicle was exposed on the pad.
It was not possible to determine how long the cracks had been
there.
A detailed study showed that the earlier analyses accepted
the material for use on the basis that it would be manufactured
in a certain manner using specified processes. In tracing back
through the recordsj it was found that certain parts were
fabricated and processed in a different way than the previous
parts. The contractor had initiated purchases with a qualified
supplier. When more parts were needed the contractor used
different purchasing methods to obtain these parts. As a result, the
- parts were obtained from a different manufacturer. Until the detailed
, search of records was maae, the contractor did not realize that these
parts had been processed in a different manner. The company
providing the parts was a second or third tier supplier;
therefore the contractor was not the direct purchaser and as a result,
was unaware of the different processing.
4
0
]97500656]-062
d. Remedial Action
Skylab program management ordered a review of every stress
corrosion susceptible piece of material on all mannefl launch
vehicles. Contractor and NASA engineering and materials personnel
were requested to conduct separate analyses: The contractor was
required to review his parts and provide information in a matrix
format on each one of the vehicle parts. As the contractor finished
his analyses, he would present his data to NASA engineers, who would
review the material and examine the contractor's rationale for
accepting a part made out of a susceptible material. Additional
information on those items was required. Through this process,
a complete re-analysis was made of all materials and their
stress corrosion susceptibility. The assessment made of the cracks
found in the fin was that the vehicle was not impaired structurally.
The results of all the analyses were also presented to the Program
Director of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, which will use a launch
vehicle with the same prob!ems. E_cept for continuing surveillance
and scheduled inspections within 48 hours of launch, no changes
have been proposed.
e. Conclusion
These instances of stress corrosion problems on engine
o actuators and the fins were not a result of management inadequacies.
The problems discussed above developed as a result of time, actual
stresses, and the environment. The management action taken was
to re-examine in greater depth all materials for their stress
corrosion susceptibility for possible elimination through use
of a different material or process. In some cases, it was
/
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Idetermined that the cracks which did develop would not impair the
vehicle structurally. To obtain thc required authorization,
an assessment was made of the cracks and the load carrying
responsibility of the cracked parts. Each crack assessment was
initially reviewed with stage and project management and again
at the "Flight Readiness Review" conducted by the Program Director.
In summary, the manage]nent technique applied was one of diligent
investigation and review of previous work without requiring high
level attention or direction except for final approval. It is based
on the philosophy to leave no stone unturned, but to pay great
attention to even apparently minor detail. Responsibility has
been delegated all the way down the line. Field inspectors
uncovered the problem and implemented action. Engineering has always
been aware of the problem but has not been able to avoid it
completely. "Visibility" of encountered risks make top level
management fully aware of the situation which they have to approve.
Some people have claimed that luunch vehicles have always
fTown with cracks, and that the implemented precautions are
overdone. The only answer here _s the success of previous
flights, which management wants to retain under all circumstances
for the few forthcoming flights. It appears, therefore, to be a
worthwhile "insurance premium" to maintain the previous flight
record.
.o
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Case Study #9: The Delta Prpject.
a. Background
This project was selected for study and analysis because
it is by now the most seasoned effort undertaken by the
Space Agency since its inception in 1958. Many more
launchings have been planned for the coming years, and
this program must therefore be appraised as a most successful
one; it has an excellent reliability -ecord and may therefore
well survive the arrival of the Space 3huttle in the 1980's_
since it provides great flexibility for the experimenters,
good performance to geosynchronous orbit and for escape
missions, while the Shuttle will require additional
propulsion systems for such high-energy requirements. For
these reasons, the Delta configuration may very well be
rather cost-compc%itive with Shuttle flight_ especially
for the smal2er payloads with quick turn-around times.
b. History
The Thor-Delta project was the first launch vehicle
effort to be crganized by the newly created Space Agency in
1959. It had its origin in the U.S. Air Force-developed
Thor IRBM missile, which had previously already been
c_bined with the 2nd and 3rd stages of the Navy-Vanguard
missile as the Thor-Able project (U.S. Air Force). The
Thor had been developed in the 1950's by the U.S. Air
Force on a crash basis to close the missile gap with the i
U
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USSR by the establishment of an interim capability in the
form of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
with a 1,500 mile range. Simultaneously, the U.S. Army
was developing the Jupiter-Missile, which had many similar
features. Both IEBM's were eventually deployed in Europe,
but have since been withdrawn when the Nation's ICBM
capability became available. While much of the Jupiter
design and many of its components formed the basis for the
Saturn launch vehicles for the Apollo Program, the Thor was
the basis for a long line of ever-improving launch vehicles
of the Delta-series.
This project was undertaken by NASA as an interim step.
Accordingly, it consisted initially of only 12 launch vehicles
to be used as boosters [or several spacecraft projects which
were ullder way and ready for early launchings. The Delta
project has been growing ever since then, and its end is
not yet in sight, although a number of future problems are
I
: shaping up, calling for drastic decisions in the not-too- -
distant future. 0
The project got off to a rather shaky start when the
first launch in May 1960 turned out to be a failure.
However, the second attempt could be undertaken only 3 months
later and resulted in orbiting the widely hailed Echo balloon,
the first spacecraft which was generally visible to the !
,l
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naked eye. The remaining i0 vehicles of the initial order
performed also rather well and orbited such well-known
spacecraft as Tiros, Ariel, OSO-I, and the commercially-
oriented (AT&T) Telstar. Indeed, the demonstrated
reliability of the Thor-Delta project as well as its
flexibility prompted NASA to provide a permanent status
to this launch vehicle in the NASA stable.
c. Delta _ianagement Philosophy
Ever since the Delta project obtained permanent status
in the launch vehicle stable of the Space Agency, project
management has pursued the philosophy to gradually upgrade
the launch vehicle capability whenever such improvements
could be obtained without significant increases in the cost
of the hardware, its preparation, checkout, and launch. Such
improvements were also always geared to actual requirements
of the many customers, who posed ever increasing demands on
. payload capability due to the sophistication of the
spacecraft systems and associated experiments. Judicious
application of cost-effectiveness considerations and careful
engineering analysis has increased the Delta payload
capability manifold, while the cost of the ve_licle hardware
and its launch has only doubled since the early 1960's.
Considering the money inflation which has grasped all
other projects as well as the spacecraft, this is an envious
result, since the "cost per pound in orbit" is now considerably
less than it was in the beginning of the pregram (more than !
a factor of 10')
11t4 _
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j Performance improvements were introduced all along the line.
Delta project management is proud to point out that the first
launch of an improved configuration has never led to a flight
failure. Credit for this must be given to tightly controlled and
well supervised Configuration Control and thorough analysis of
the effect of proposed changes on the entire system.
Typical improvements include uprating of upper stages,
advanced guidance systems, larger propellant tanks, and
especially an augmentation of take-off thrust by strap-on solid
rockets. Improvements will be maintained once they have been
introduced; no units will be produced with the outdated design.
Delta Management has introduced this policy of continued
I
upgrading for two reasons: %he ever increasing user demands,
and the recognition that it increases reliability. It permits
upgrading of components with better reliability characteristics
and prevents that engineers and technicians become stale and
bored. It appears that Delta project management has succeeded
to crgate an excellent team spirit. The morale is high, and the
desire to add to an already excellent record of performance is
utmost in everyone's mind.
i
• i
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Pd. Reliability of the System
, The issue of reliability has been uppermost in the minds
of the Delta managers ever since the initial failure. The
current environment of fewer but more costly research and
development spacecraft as well as th6 fact that the Delta
vehicles are being used extensively for _mmercial ventures
<3
as well as for foreign flights adds impetus to profit and
loss considerations of these associates. A strong desire
to further increase the overall success ratio is therefore
in existence. The management approach in this area has been
an evolutionary proce,-zs. The first Delta contract in 1960
merely stated a reliability of 90% as a design goal.
Subsequent contracts incorporated various incentive clauses
to emphasize the requirement for high probability of success.
A bonus was awarded for each successful mission, and a
penalty will be assessed for all those missions which are
judged as failures. The amounts of the bonus and penalty have
varied, but the penalty is normally ab(dt ten times as large
as the bonus, which has been a very strong inducement indeed.
P
This woul4 be representative of a 90_ reliability performance,
and only when the contractor obtains a better ratio than
that will he earn additional awards. The program has
demonstrated a better performance than that, and it is
expected to improve even further in the future. This must
be considered as a very respectable performance under
consideration oi ne limited funds which have been available
to unmanned programs like the Delta project. I_ should not
66
i
"_,1 il i.
A
......' ........ .....I..... I .... "-'T-...............-7 .........: ...."C . _'-'_........._- ..., ..............
] 97500656 ] -069
be compared with the $pollo program, where much more ample
fund_ were allocated in order to obtain "man-rated" performance
characteristics. The Delta project is making use of some of
the Apollo ccmponents in order to improve the success ratio
_ of the p_ oject.
e. Summary
As is evident from the previous paragraphs, the Delta
project is being planned under entirely different auspices
than the Apollo program. In this latter case, most of the
planning was done "upstream", while only very little
reprogramming of basi_..ally different technical approaches
took place. Mo_ t _ the reprogramming for Apollo was to meet
mishaps, schedule delays, cost problems, etc. For the Delta
project the situation is entirely different. Only very little
planning was done "upstream" and most of the planning has
ever since then consisted of logical replanning to meet the
new customer requirements and to meet h_.gher reliability goals.
This planning must be accompanied by ccntinuing systems
l
analysis and detailed systems engineering to assure interface
compatibility, and to accommodate the future customer needs.
Continued customer-project relationships must therefore be
established and maintained.
However, this continuing analysis work seen_ to appeal
to the engineers, designers, and technicians, and has apparently
i built up a tremendous team spir4t that equals the one that
:: existed during the Apollo days. This feature seems to be one
. _,................... .......................... 67
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of the most important ones of the project. Without it,
it might easily run into problems and launch failures, which
just cannot be tolerated _t this time.
In the meantime it appea_-s that project management is
T
keeping its eyes and ears open for future improvement possi-
bilities, since the competition from the Shuttle will be
tough. The Delta launches will have to be able to demonstrate
the potential for further improvements, a continued high
reliabili.y and success ratio, and a large amount of
flexibility in schedules and integration requirements to
the experimenters. In that case, the possibility for a
continuing program is good. In any case, by 1980 the Delta
project has had a lifetime of more than 20 years, which
is much better than the life expectancy of most projects
of this type at this time period. Even the Space Shuttle
is only planning for a 20 year operational period. For a
program which was started on an interim basis, like the Delta
project, iV has performed in a marvellous fashion.
The reasons for its success appear to be a continuing
demand for this type of service based on NASA's responsiveness
to customer needs. _anagement always paid attention to detail
.o avoid mishaps. An excellent team spirit assured quality
performance and reliability. These success-oriented manage-
ment philosophies have provided outstanding motivation tbr
a team which carried this "interim" program to such long
lasting performance records.
68
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Case Study #i0: Applications Tcchno!ogy S_.te!l_ite,_(ATS)
Progr mn
a. Overview
The launch of the Applications Technology Satellite F
--(ATS-F) on 30 _1ay 1974 has been called the most important
35
launch of 1974, since it will advance communications technology
and their applications greatly, and since it demonstrated NASA's
payload, capability in the years prior to the Shuttle availability:
A Titan _T-C rocket carried a payload of more than 3000 pounds
into geosynchronous orbit, which will represent maximum US
orbital capabilities for some years to come.
ATS-F was renmmed _.TS-6 after a successful launch. It is a
complex, but most versatile and powerful communications spacecraft,
which will operate over the next two to five years from several
selected orbital positions in geosynchronous altitude, and will
serve as an t_ternational experimental broadcasting station
in space. It is powerful enough to beam signals directly to small
ground receivers, which can be produced rather inexpensively.
Of greatest interest are health and educational television programs;
but ATe-6 carries a total of 22 sets of equipment which can
conduct 40 scientific and technological experiments, many of them
international in their scope.
_5) NASA Activities, "ATS-F Launch" May 15, 1974, Volume 5,
Page 98. t
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b. History. of Communications Satellites 36
ATS-6 is the latest in a unique series of NASA
"Application Technology Satellites (ATS)", which are to
collect and confirm data for various space flight hechnologies
and applications, especially in the field of communications.
The underlying management philosophy of the ATS-program
has been to be responsive to the communications-oriented
customer by the design, launch, and operation of multiple-
mission satellites. Flexibility to meet changing require-
; ments will demand adaptable and versatile mounting provisions
for a variety of experimental payloads. This is to be done
at reasonable cost and on a schedule compatible with the
e._periments availability. This philosophy led to the need
for major technological advances, which eventually led to
concepts in functional systems as incorporated in the ATS-F
spacecraft.
I
c. ATS-F/ATS-6 Satellite
Program management proposed a major increase in spacecraft
size and communications capabilities over the initial Series of
spin-stabilized satellites 3_ a new principle of 3-axis stabiliz-
ation was mandatory for these improved capabilities calling'for
;" 36)"" The ATS-F Data Book, A Publication by the Goddard Space
Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland 20771
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new concepts and a major redesign of the spacecraft. The NASA
Field Center (Goddard), which had administered all previous ATS
contracting, started a phased progr._n planning activity in 1969,
which led eventually to 3 parallel Phase A (feasibility) studies
with the General Electric Company, Fairchild Industries, and the
Lockheed Corporation. After completion of this Phase, two
contracts for $5 _lillion each with the General Electric and
Fairchild Industries conducted Phase B/C definition and design
activities for the finalization of such a novel spacecraft.
The contract for development and construction was initially
awarded to the General Electric Company. However, the competing
contractor objected to the NASA selection, and after a review
under GAO auspices, the final award was made to Fairchild
Industries. This protest and the subsequent change in contractors
has probably led to a better definition of the spacecraft and all
its subsystems than would have been obtained without the extra
effort. In any case, the final execution of the ATS-F program
led to a very successful development in a rather rapid sequence
of events, in spite of the contractual requirement to integrate
a number of preferred design features of the competing contractor.
A very successful launch with a Titan TXT-C launch vehicle
on 30 May 1974 started a most successful operational period
of the many, periments during the initial operation of the
ATS-6 over the United States, where it is now conducting
communications experiments for HEW, local Governments, health
organizations, and other governmental and scientific organizations,
until it will be repositioned for a year over the subcontinent of
India for an international education experiment for the Indian
Government.
d. Program Appraisal
In spite of the launch vehicle problems for AT8-2 and 4--
which were thoroughly investigated in the established manner--
the ATS program has been appraised as a very successful one
especially in regard to the most recent launch of ATS-F/6.
What are the reasons behind such success? Of special interest
is the question how different is the management from that of
Apollo?
One apparent difference i_ in the planning process. Most of
the Apollo planning was done right at the beginning of the program,
and only very little reprogramming occured during its executicn.
A minor amount of lunar and in-flight experimentation was added
during Apollo. The major change was the addition of the lunar
rover which in spite of its importance in regard to exploration
results represents only a rather small fraction of the total
Apollo effort. In case of ATS it is evident that a lot of
replanning occurred all the way along the line. This is
natural and explainable by the main objectives of the ATS
program, mai uly to _dvance the "state of the art". This
planning method will make it impossible to arrive at firm total
program costs at the outset. It will provide maximum flexibility
i :i
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for incorporation of latest technologies and be highly responsive
to latest L_t results fronl previous flights. The entire
management structure and progrm_ control is laid out for this
specific purpose. It must also be considered that the
entire program is much smaller in scope than the Apollo Program
was. It lends itself to greater flexibility in programming, and
less rigidity in the overall structure of the program, even
being able to change objectives. This is also made possible by
the fact that the hTS-program was never as much in the limelight
of public attention as Apollo was at some time. This permits
_uch greater flexibility to all kind of reprogramming measures
without any public pressure. Strictly scientific and technological
considerations: can make up the ground rules. This will enhance the
appeal to the scientific community, and to all the users. The
details of the program can always be responsive to the latest
needs and desires, as long as they can be accomplished within the
established scope and overall framework.
Another outstanding feature that was found is the great amount
of team spirit and dedication. Everyone on the team was willing
to work long hours, to track down problems until they have been
solved, to find better cays of doing things, to be responsive to
the scientists, to meet demanding international requirements, to
be open and caudid. The government-contractor team appeared often
r
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as really only one crew. There was great mutual understanding,
maximum responsiveness to new needs, and a willingness to help
the program and to improve its performance. The location o2 the
Government team and of the contractor operation seemed to have
beneficial results on such cooperation. It was relatively easy
for the Government to participate very strongly in all phases of
the ATS development by just moving over to the contractor plant
for a while, and by participating in all important steps.
This situation and t_e inherent flexibility determined also
the actions taken in regard to apparently the greatest problems:
The cooperation with the immensely large group of customers,
often being of international scope° In this area, the ATS
prehlems appear relatively to be even larger than the ones on
Apollo, due to the deep involvement of scientists in this program,
while Apollo was essentially an operational problem with
relatively little scientific involvement.
The existing management systems and organizational
, arrangements seem to be fully adequate for these diffi_-ult
tasks of experiment accommodation and integration. The established
[,
management philosophy supports these activities to the highest
possible degree.
74
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Case Study #11: Lunar Orbiter Project
Background
The Lu,lar Orbiter Project which was one of NASA's
unmanned projects was considered highly successful. There
were five flights in five attempts during a one year
period, all successful. Lunar Orbiter I which was launched
August 10, 1966, was the first U.S. spacecraft to orbit the
moon. Lunar Orbiter V, the last in the series, was launched
August 1, 1967.
The first three Lunar Orbiters essentially satisfied the
primary objective to obtain high resolution photographs of
proposed Apollo landing sites. The fourth Orbiter systematically
photographed the near side of the moon and the fifth Orbiter
completed the far-side coverage.
The five Orbiter spacecraft returned over 1654 high quality
photographs taken from lunar orbit. Each spacecraft was
similarly equipped with two cameras which operated simultaneously
and had the same line of sight but different fields of view and
resolutions. The cameras utilized a common supply of 70-mm
film and the dual images they recorded were referred to as
medium-resolution frames and high-resolution frames.
. The primary emphasis was not only to support the
Apollo program but to provide more detail in many areas
that had been studied from earth-oased observation. At the
average Orbiter altitude of about 3000 km for the photographs,
the resolution of the two cameras were approximately 500 meters and
65 meters, whereas under favorable conditions, earth-based
photography of the moon reveal details only as small as37
500 to 1000 meters.
37) "Da'vld E. Bowker and J. Kendrlck Hughes, "Lunar Orbiter
Photographic Atlas of the Moon," NASA SP-206, 1971, page I.
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Management Approaches and Philosophies
What were the ingredients which made this project such
an outstanding ,_,,_eess? It turned out tha_ there were many
factors which contributed without any one factor being the
dominant or most critical one. Just about everything went right
for the project. First of all, since the project was a direct
Apcllo support activity, it had well defined and easily
recognized goals and schedules. This is, all personnel
working on the project were aware of its importance in
relation to Apollo and also were cognizant of the need to meet
their schedule conuaitments. Also, the NASA (Langley Research
Center) and industry (The Boeing Company) team both enjoyed
the reputation of taking on only those assignments they
knew they could accomplish.
NASA set the tightest possible schedule. The
development and flight of the first spacecraft was to be made
in 26 months. It was completed in 28 months. Even though
the final costs exceeded the priliminary estimate by 50%,
it was far less than the price rise normally experienced in
other projects where total costs often were double or triple
the f_rst estimate3. 8 It was also felt that the higher costs
. experienced were somewhat offset by the wide expansion of the
project objectives. Originally the only objective was to find
smooth lunar landing areas for the Apollo spacecraft_ In
addition to this, the lunar orbiter provided enough photos
to map the back side of *.he moon.
The Lunar Orbiter objectives were specifically directed
toward Apollo requirements and toward the general scientific
exploration of the moon and its vicinity. The objectives
consisted of three general categories of information to be
obtained. These were 1) Apollo, photographic which consisted
of Site certification and selection, landmark mapping, and
geological survey; 2) Apollo, non-photographic which consisted
i 38) "Lunar Orbiter Team Lauded for Effort as Program is
. Ended", Aerospace Technology, September II, 1967, page 18.
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of gravitational field, mierometeorite flux, and high-energy
particle flux; and 3) Genera] scientific which consisted of
radar refleetivity, magnetic field, and thermal (IR) mapping.
The project was organized with program direction at
NASA Headquarters, project direction at Langley Research
Center, prime contractor--the Boeing Company, launch vehicle
responsibility at Lewis Research Center, launch facilities at
KSC including use of the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR), and
ground based tracking and mission control at Jet Propulsion
Lab or atory.
i The major project constraints were I) launch with
proven vehicles (Atlas-Agena), 2) spacecraft designed with
' conservative weight limitations, 3) launch from KSC,
4) flight operations and control from Deep Space Network
: (DSN), and 5) manimum use of space flight qualified components°
The project manager at Langley Research Center was
i strongly people oi'iented. In looking back over the projectI
i
he had no hesitation in pointing out the importance of people
i as the single most important element of the project manage-
I ment approach taken by Langley on Lunar Orbiter. He
1] enumerated four standards for project personnel management
I governing Lunar Orbiter at Langley. These were:
i I. The right people with the right specilization
were carefully selected to fill each individual
slot in the project office.
2. Thorough consideration was given to the
compatibility of individuals with other personnel
in the project organization.
3. Heavy emphasis was placed in "the selection procesz!
on the past demonstrated ability of candidates
to dedicate themselves totally to activities
I focused on achievement of a given objective.
E
4. Managers at all levels of the project organization
gave full recognition to the importance of main-
- taining "esprit de corps" and enthusiasm on the
part of all project personnel in working towards
fulfillment of project goals.
- The Boeing project manager described the Langley-
i Boeing relationship as follows. "The constant presence of
highly qualified and exacting customer (NASA) personnel could
i 77
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have created a difficult situation. This, however, turned out
to be an asset. The attitude of the NASA people demonstrated the
importance of the project and their dedication to it. Boeing
employees were equally dedicated and the small size of the
project and proximity to hardware established a real sense of
belonging to the team. This attitude carried the project
through many trying and difficult times." Good communications
between Boeing and Langley were further assured by the
frequency of reviews and meetings between the two.
The establishment of an efficient work breakdown structure
contributed substantially to effective contract management.
Costs of each individual task could be accurately measured.
Lunar Orbiter broke new ground in a number of management
systems. It was the first space project to apply NASA Publication
NPC 250-I, Reliability Program Provisions for Space System
Contracto:s. For Boeing, the project represented the first
application of PERT and Companion Cost as the sole management
control system. They were adopted with full intent to make them
work. However, none of the Boeing managers cited PERT as a
factor in the success of the project, although credit was
given to "central scheduling and. status reporting" as a
contributor to effective management. While the formal
reporting and control systems contributed significantly to the
success of Lunar Orbiter, all those involved in the project
attributed m great deal to the ease of informal communications,
the encouragement given by both customer (NASA) and contractor t
management to full and free exchanL.; of information, and the
contractor's concern for keeping NASA fully informed on all
potential problems.
All changes to the design were held to an absolute
minimum. Before a change was presented to NASA for approval,
it had to be approved by the contractor's project manager.
This limited changes to only those critical to the mission
performance.
The early involvement of a strong ground testing program
also contributed to the project's success.
_ All of the above dealt with those item which contributed ;:
to the success of the project. There were some items which
lessened the project's management effectively. One of these
78 ._
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iwas the incompatibility in contract form between the prime
contractor and the principal subcontractors. It appeared
that both NASA and Boeing were slow in recognizing the need
to pin down the subcontractors to a commitment such as an
incentive contract before start-up of development operations.
The absence of incentive provisions in the two major subcontracts
left Boeing with little leverage over control of the subcontractors.
Although the r£_ults, which might have been gained by use ol
subcontracts with incentive provisions remain hypothetical,
it appears that cost overrun penalties might have held down
some of the substantial overrun costs in the photo system.
Summary and Conclusions
The Lunar Orbiter project was a relatively short range
project that fol" the most part utilized existing technologies.
The first flight was accomplished in 28 months and the last
flight was one year after the first flight. It.also
required a relatively small amount of people. Foi" the most
part, it utilized off the shelf components and existing
qualified launch vehicle._;.
The basic management philosophy was one of selecting
. the right individual for each job. The individual was not
• only considered for his technical competence, but also his
capability to get along or be compatible with others in _.he
organization with which he would have to interface, og"NASA
i
developed a definitive _ontract for the prime contractol to
meet. The prime contractor was intent on meeting the
t_zhnical and schedule requirements of his contract almost
to the point of creating excessive cost overruns. As mentioned
previously, some of the cost overruns were the result of not
having a tight or incentivized contract with the subcontractors.
_'9')" E_ra_smus'H. Kloman, "Unmanned Space Project Management,
Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter", NASA SP-4901, 1972, page 17. '
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wBoth NASA and industry personnel working on this project
were highly motivated. They were aware ef the importance
of this project to the upcoming Apollo program, and as a
result, put forth effort which was many times over and above
their normal obligations. With this type of effort and interest
on the part of everyone concerned, the Lunar Orbiter Project
became the success that it was.
l
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TF. Conclusion
When this research study was started about a year ago,
it was hoped tba_ a few outstanding characteristics o£
managel-s or management approaches could be uncovered which _"
would assure success for the conduct of a program. The
only "tall poles" that could be £oun_. and that could demon-
strate impcrta__'".e to program management were the three
statements -
"Attention to detail" 17 18
"Leave no stone unturned" and
"Be aggressive--not passive ''8
Because of _ ir generality, these statement_ we_.
initially not even recognized as "tall poles" but an analysis
of their implications for the conduct of a program gave
P_ fina?.ly reason to believe tbat these philosophies create
policies and management metheds which are highly conducive
to program success. They lead to comprehensive and complete
planning, to include successful integration of people and
facii'ties for optimum project performance. Such "team"
should contaln the best available experts in those fields
that are of importance to the program• Flexibility in
appi'oach, employment of personnel and utilization of facilities
should be a key element of the plan. Such flexibility was
demonstratud by the rather late introductio.| of the "all-up"
conCep_ for the Apollo Program as well as "open-ended"
planning for many flight missions. Task teams, Tiger Teams,
working groups and similal- temporary assignments demonstrate
.I
19) = George },I. Low, '_hat _ade Apollo A Success?", page 45.
18) Wernher yon Braun, Interview, Summer 19;4.
8) Lee B. James, "Management of NASA'a Majol Projects", page 3.
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how great flexibility in the deployment of personnel can be
obtained to good advantage for the project. No additional staffing
was needed for these activities. ?,_anagement drew on the manpower
of the ex.isting .rganizations. The Saturn Program has in time
applied all phases of organizational arrangements from the purely
functional organization, through the Matrix arrangement to the
togally project-oriented set up. .'dethods of directing and
cont-_'olli_,g have always been kept flexible by all levels of
management in all discussed _ASA projects.
A more detailed summary of the impact of the above mentioned
philosophies is given in the next paragraphs. They are arranged
in typical textbook fashion in the 5 major areas of management
15
activities.
Planning
This most vital management function must cover all
phases and portions of the program and must consider influences
from outside of the project. The magnitude of the task to be
tackled must be appraised with realism. All resources that
are neeaed to do the job must be clearly defined at the outset.
Of further importance is the optimization of relationships
of all team players co each other and to their "interfaces"
with the tside world, as well a_ with the material and
" equipment at their disposal.
All key participants must have inputs into the initial
definition of the project, as well as a continuing part in
the final decision making processes. The role of the manager
here is essentially to assure the desired wide psxticipation,
to solici_ the right kind of analyses and studies, to receive
the inputs for his own evaluation, and to einally present the
selected modes of operation, technical design, organization,
_. i5) Ha_rold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, "Principles of
Management", McGraw-Hill, 1972.
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and other key elements of the integrated program, to his
superiors. These may be elements outside of the Agency which
administers the projcc _.
The integration u_ participants is of utmost importance
for the success of any 1. rge project. Accordingly, NASA
placed considerable emphasis from the beginning on complete
:. technical and managerial integration of all project personnel.
i These consisted of members from several NASA Centers, NASA
_ Headquarters, large and small industries, other Government
Agencies, scientists from academic institutions, and sometimes
even foreign participants, especially in the areas of scientific
experimentation. This brief summary of the key planning functions
indicates already that problems of organization, st._ffing,
directing, and even controlling have to he considered simultaneously
with the technical requirements which cften contribute less
to the managers problems than these other areas.
40
Other studies have also found that one of the
most important ingredients to success is the support by Top-
Level Management, going all the way up to elements possibly
even outside of NASA. In the instance of Apollo, presidential
and congressional support were such vital elements. It appears
to this investigator, that without this support completion of
the lunar landing might w_ll have been endangered.
For this reason i c appears most desirable that specific
milestones in the program plan be established to bring progress ¢
to the attention of those who provide such support. The
budget cycle may well be usedfor this purpose. In the mid-term
and lunar landing phases of Apollo, the general publicity by
television and other news media accomplished this task
automatically. This was not true any longer for the finalp
phase of the Apollo program, nor for any other NASA project,
_0) David Charles Murphy, Bruce N. Baker, Dalmar Fisher,
"Determinants of Project Success" --School of Management, --
Boston College, Chestnut Hills, Mass. 1974.
!
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Since program planning is of such vital importance to
a_Jy large project, Chapter D- "Impact of "Management Philosophies
on Major NASA Programs" has given a brief description of a few
typical management decisions made early in the Apollo program.
- Organizing
A suitable organizational frame work is the key to the
successful execution of any program. As was sho_n in case of
the Saturn/Apollo program 2 the top leadership in NASA had
recognized from the beginning that the magnitude of the lunar
landing would not permit that just one group of people would
be able to perform the task with their available resources.
It was considered necessary from the beginning to plan for
teamwork• Excellent cooperation became a vital element
to accomplish the work. The project team was to be composed
of members from all NASA Field Centers, small and large
corporations from private industry, elements of the military
establishment, and universities. This program was visualized
as a national endeavour. No concentration in any one locale
would be considered acceptable. Therefore, as many of the States
and industrialized regions of the Nation as possible had to
" be included in the team. The role of NASA Headquarters Offices
was from the very beginning to organize such national efforts
and to provide for proper management of such a variety cf 0
team members. In spite of these provisions it became necessary
at several occasions to establish special task teams to solve
particular problems. These teams reported to top-level
management. Their activities were of short duration; the
teams were disbanded as soon as the special assignment w,-_
completed.
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Staffing
It was evident from the outset of the Apollo Program
that the technical requirements for the accomplishment of
the task were so demanding £hat ways and means had to be
found to bring the Nation's topmost experts to bear on the
program. This was particularly true for such engineering
challenges as presented by the requiremel, ts for immense
rocket power for vehicle lift-off; the need for guidance
and navigation accuracies to steer the space-craft to
tremendous distances and to guarantee safe return from the
moon, Similar tasks had been performed before in other NASA
programs; but now the requirements 1or dependability and
reliability had to be increased immensely sin ze human lives
were at stake and the manned program could not tolerate the
risks that had been taken previously. Backup capabilities
and multiple redundancies were introduced. The Nations
leading experts in Government and private industry were
called upoD to particiDate in these new endeavours.
In the case of rocket power, the in-house capabilities of
the _Iarshall Space Flight Center were used extensively in
"Arsenal _Ianagement" methods to utilize the available NASA
knowledge, heavily supported by contractor efforts.
" It was concluded early in the program that extensive
use of com_uter technology would be needed to accomFlish the
tasks. It became, therefore, necessary to acquire the
people who could develop new computer systems, associated
computer "software", and the bl_d scale application schemes
of this new technology in many areas which were new to this
kind of exposure.
On the other hand, it was recognized that all these
teams should be kept small to keep the program within fiscal
limits. But even more important was management's desire to
provide a continuing challenge to those top level experts
in order to keep their interest alive0
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Directing
Broad application of teamwork philosophies laid tile
corner stone for the success that has been displayed Xn all
major NASA projects, but especially tile Saturn/Apollo program.
This was possible, although a teamwork arrangement does not
necessarily make project direction easier. To make the
project team perform efficiently, NASA Ileadquarters established
centralized program control in Washington as the hub of
operations. Decentralized project execution at the Field
Centers implemented the program requirements for all efforts
at the contractor sites or Government owned assembly, test
and launch facilities. The program manager at NASA Headquarters
looked after the Agency's broad interests, while contractor
and Field Center Direc'cors assured successful execution o£
the project as well as timely quality performance in all
instances.
The Project _lanagers provided active leadership ._.n
_1] above specified areas and had the full and whole-hearted
support of Center _Ianagement as well as from NASA Headquarters
elements. This system also provided for quick response,
flexibil i_coordinated communications.
" Controlling
The implementation of the above ,,utlined policies will
lead to the following features of a _1anagement control system.
Such system was applied to the Saturn/Apollo Program, and
with small deviations to many other NASA projects of similar
nature. It is described in good detail in the often-quoted
8
James report. For this reason, it shall suffice here to
just su_,mrize a few typical control system highlights:
, _) Lee B_ James, "_anagement of NASAVs Major Projects".
8
A
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1. Absolute concentration of all resources in the
hands of the manager, to be applied to critical events or
problem areas at his discretion on sl=ort notice.
2. Shared authority with others, but clearly focussed
responsibility in tile hands of the manager and his designated
agent for specific actions.
3. Delegation of decision making authority to the lo xst
possible level in the organization for quick response and
optimum decisions based on correct and up-to-date information.
("Working Level" 2nvolvement throughout the program.)
4. Emphasis on communications to assure complete under-
standing of objectives, approaches, and requirements by all
team members; stress on "visibil!t}," of all actions.
_pollo program management put greatest emphasis on program
controls 14 The utilized control documents and/or functions
are summarized in the enclosure. A very detailed description
of the Saturn _lanagement Control Room and its operation is
, included in "The Saturn Nanagement Concept". TM
14) Samuel C. Phillips, "Management Scheme for Apollo", page 195.
16) Roger E. Bilstein, "The Saturn _Ianagement Concept."
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G. "S U ;4 M A 1_ Y"
The results of this study indicate that the_:'e appears to
be no single, outstanding charact_-istic of program management
that will assure success. It was found that neither the character-
istics of the program manager, nor a specific organizational struc-
ture deserve the sole credit for a successful program. It was
also determined that neither specific management methods nor
operating procedures can be singled out for such distinction.
In fact, management, organizational arrangements, use of methods and
procedures underwen¢ several changes during the studied NASA prcgrams.
If there are any characteristics that deserve particular
emphasis and that should lead to program success, they are--on the
basis of this study--top level support; clear definition of
program objectives; the amount of dedication that the manager
and his team bring to the job; the communication between them,
and to the outside; their knowledge and expertise in respective
• 4_1_ _ .,.,_,....,_,... and motivation to accomplish the nhjeetives
in time, on schedule, and within the framework of established
constraints. It is the manager's prime task to generate for his
project the conditions that make the realization of these
characteristics as likely as possible. He can accomplish this by
" proper application of conducive management philosophies which
..mphasize "agressive action" - "Attention to detail"- "To leave
no stone unturned"- and to proceed with the formation of a strong
team to assist in the conduct of these tasks.
The selected 11 ca_e studies have served to demonstrate some
of these implications. NASA's senior management was aware from the
beginning that objectives, people, and facilities could only be
successfully integrated if superior management methods were
applied. Approaches of the early sixties were not believed to be
• satisfactory without modifications and improvements, although they set
the general pattern for the finally utilized systems.
Accordingly, NASA generated an extensive set of management
L instructions, handbooks, guidelines, specifications and other
)
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pertinent information. These are well documented in the articles by
' 13
Robert C. Seamans, Jl., by Sam C. Phillips 14 (see a!so Enclosure)
and by the Lee B. James report on "Management of NASA's Major
• rt_
Projects.
This information has been used f_r the recently completed
Skylab Program, and will be utilized again-with certain improve-
ments and modifications-- for the Space Shuttle project and its
application to large-scale earth and space exploration.
It can be expected that the discovered management philosophies
can also be applied to non-aerospace programs. It appears however,
that NASA's management methods, procedures, and documents will
require careful appraisal and adaptation, just as tbey do for new
NASA projects. The existing information and documentation
provides a huge pool of data from which effective tools can be
obtained that will aid in the management of future programmatic
challenges.
, ) , $
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* Samuel C. Phillips, Major G£neral USAF,
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Technology Series, Vol. 12, "The Management of
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t Society), page 197.
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